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Both Congress and the Indiana General Assembly have passed statutes called "RICO Acts" to combat "racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations." There is a conflict between opinions of the Court of Appeals as to whether liability under the Indiana RICO Act extends only to persons who direct racketeering activity (the rule under the Federal RICO Act) or extends below the managerial or supervisory level to a racketeering enterprise’s "foot soldiers" as well. Because the Indiana Act uses language significantly broader than that of the Federal Act, we conclude that it imposes RICO liability both on persons at and below a racketeering enterprise’s managerial or supervisory level.
Conclusion (slip op. at 2): We vacate the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants Baugher, Florida Underwriting, and Jones with respect to the plaintiffs’ Indiana RICO Act allegations. In all other respects, we summarily affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion and that of the Court of Appeals.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 6): The most important difference between the language of these two statutes is that the Federal Act imposes liability on a person who "conduct[s] or participate[s] . . . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs" while the Indiana Act imposes liability on a person who "conducts or otherwise participates in the activities of that enterprise." . . . by not using "conduct" as a noun, the Legislature wrote the Indiana Act to mean . . . a statute that extends liability beyond just those who conduct the racketeering enterprise’s affairs to reach those who assist the enterprise below the managerial or supervisory level.
Shepard, C.J., and Boehm, J., concurring.
Dickson, J., dissenting with separate opinion in which Rucker, J., concurs: The Court today construes Indiana’s RICO Act to impose liability beyond those who substantially participate in the enterprise, to persons below the managerial or supervisory level, based upon linguistic variation between the Federal RICO statute and the Indiana Act. I disagree, finding the modest language differences to be insignificant and inconclusive. . .
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Appellant-plaintiff Stan Klotz appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for breach of lease against appellees-defendants Sarah Hoyt and Chrissy Kornmann.1 Klotz contends that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was not entitled to rent and damages because he allegedly failed to provide an itemized list of damages to Hoyt and Kornmann within the forty-five-day statutory timeframe.
Conclusion (slip op. at 2): Finding that Klotz was not required to comply with the forty-five-day timeframe to be entitled to back due rent payments and that, for the purpose of damages and the security deposit, he did comply with the relevant statutes, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to enter judgment in Klotz’s favor in the amount of $6,000.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 6-7): A landlord merely seeking to recover back rent . . . should not be required to provide a list of itemized damages to the property, which is irrelevant to the amount of rent contractually owed by the tenant . . . [the security deposit] statute in no way affects or hampers the landlord’s ability and right to sue the tenants for the rent that they are contractually obligated to pay.
FRIEDLANDER, J. and ROBB, J., concurring: I concur in the result . . . because I agree that the lease agreement was terminated on . . . and that Klotz provided an itemized list of damages within forty-five days of this termination. However, I am concerned that allowing a landlord to provide this notice on the day of a hearing contravenes the purpose of the notice requirement . . .
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UNPUBLISHED
Municipal Tax Liens, Inc. ("MTL") appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Michael Alexander regarding MTL’s attorney malpractice complaint against Alexander. MTL raises one issue, which we revise and restate as whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Alexander.
Conclusion (slip op. at 10): We reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to Alexander and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 8-9, 10): The Indiana Supreme Court has held that legal malpractice claims are not assignable . . . Douglas’s affidavit does not expressly state that CARP had a malpractice claim against Alexander and assigned it to MTL. Rather the affidavit merely states that the settlement reached by MTL and CARP was offset and reduced by the amount of losses attributed to the tax certificates and liens . . . We conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding whether MTL is a direct continuation of RAP and whether RAP assigned the legal malpractice claim to MTL. Thus, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Alexander.
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FLAUM, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Mobley worked for Allstate Insurance (“Allstate”) for 16 years before being laid off with 31 other employees in Oct. 2003 as part of a reduction in force. In July 2001, Mobley had begun having problems concentrating and staying awake at work, due to what was ultimately diagnosed as essential tremor and nocturnal myoclonus. From fall 2002 until April 2003, Mobley wrangled with her supervisors over workplace accommodations for her conditions. In May 2003, Allstate permitted Mobley to regularly work in a private room rather than a cubicle. Although Mobley’s earlier, temporary placement in this private room had improved her work performance, Mobley’s performance level never reached the “meets” level after May 2003, causing her name to be included on the RIF in Oct. of that year. Mobley subsequently brought suit against Allstate under the ADA, bringing claims for failure to accommodate her disability, discriminatory termination, and unlawful retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate on all claims, which Mobley now appeals.
Conclusion (slip op. at 18): We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendant’s favor.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 14, 16): Mobley’s claim that Allstate failed to reasonably accommodate her disability fails because she has failed to meet her burden of showing that her other requests did in fact constitute reasonable accommodations . . . Given that Mobley acknowledges that her performance had slipped during that time and does not challenge Allstate’s methodology for finding that she was performing below a “meets” level, Mobley cannot establish her prima facie case for discriminatory termination.
WOOD, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: ". . . while I join the majority’s resolution of Mobley’s retaliation claim, I respectfully dissent from its decision to affirm summary judgment on the other two theories."
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Mary D. Miller ("Miller") prevailed on a claim filed in Vanderburgh Superior Court for medical malpractice against Thomas K. Hupfer ("Hupfer"). She filed a motion for prejudgment interest, which the trial court granted. Hupfer appeals and argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded prejudgment interest to Miller.
Conclusion (slip op. at 6): The trial court was within its discretion to award prejudgment interest at a rate of 8%. Affirmed.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 3, 5): Since this case is a tort case, TPIS applies and preempts common law prejudgment interest . . . TIPS does not apply if the amount of the offer exceeds one and 1/3 of the amount of the judgment. Since the demand did not exceed one and 1/3 of the amount of the judgment, the statute applies . . . TPIS states that a "court may award prejudgment interest as part of a judgment." Also, TPIS applies to "any civil action arising out of tortious conduct." Miller complied with the requirements of the TPIS; therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion when it awarded prejudgment interest.
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After a policyholder was involved in a automobile accident in Virginia while driving a rental car owned by Enterprise Leasing ("Enterprise"), Safe Auto Insurance Company ("Safe Auto") filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in Adams Circuit Court arguing its policyholder was not driving a covered vehicle, and therefore, there was no coverage under the Safe Auto policy. Enterprise then moved for summary judgment asserting that Safe Auto’s policy language excluding coverage for leased vehicles is void because it is contrary to Indiana Code section 27-8-9-9. The trial court agreed and entered summary judgment in favor of Enterprise. Safe Auto appeals and argues that there is no conflict between the statute and its policy provision.
Conclusion (slip op. at 2): We conclude that while Safe Auto’s extraordinarily limited coverage for leased vehicles is unusual at the very least, this limited coverage is not in conflict with state statute. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it granted Enterprise’s motion for summary judgment and we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 7-8): Harrison never agreed in writing to provide insurance coverage for the Enterprise truck . . . because section 27-8-9-9 applies only when the lessee agrees to provide insurance coverage, we conclude that the statute is not applicable to the circumstances presented in this appeal . . . Even if section 27-8-9-9 applied, we would not conclude that Safe Auto’s policy language is unenforceable. As our courts and the 7th Circuit have noted, section 27-8-9-9 simply sets forth a rule to determine which insurance policy provides primary coverage where concurrent policies exist. Safe Auto’s policy language excluding coverage for rental vehicles in certain circumstances does not run afoul of the plain language of the statute.
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UNPUBLISHED
Debra Byrum appeals the trial court’s order denying her request for unpaid commissions earned before Bookout Properties terminated her employment. Specifically, Byrum maintains that the trial court erred as a matter of law by concluding that her written commission schedule did not satisfy the “signed and written” requirement of the Statute of Frauds, specifically, Indiana Code § 32-21-1-10.
Conclusion (slip op. at 2): Concluding that her written commission schedule satisfies Indiana Code § 32-21-1-10, we reverse and remand.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 6-7): We conclude that because Bookout clearly agreed to pay Byrum a commission once a contract for a house was signed and Byrum performed her part of the bargain, Indiana Code §32-21-1-10 does not operate to prevent enforcement of the agreement . . . From the time Byrum began as a full-time employee, Bookout followed this commission schedule, and neither party denies that this writing sets forth the agreement between the parties. As a matter of law, Bookout’s written commission schedule satisfies Indiana Code § 32-21-1-10.
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The Lake George Cottagers Association (hereinafter "the Association") sought a declaratory judgment the State owns the real estate underneath a dam built in the 1930s and is therefore responsible for repairing it. The Association and the State both moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the Association’s motion.
Conclusion (slip op. at 2): We find the legislature could not have intended the Lake Preservation Act to confer on the State "a right, a title, or an interest in or to the property" where a dam is located. Ind. Code § 14-27-7.5-4. We accordingly reverse and direct the entry of summary judgment for the State.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 6, 7): If the legislature had intended to acquire ownership of public freshwater lakes via the Lake Preservation Act, it would not have subsequently enacted a statutory scheme to authorize its "jurisdiction and supervision over the maintenance and repair of" dams it already owned. Nor would it have promulgated statutes to permit the DNR to issue notices of violations to itself or to recover from itself the cost of emergency measures . . . The State did not become an "owner" of the land under the Mill Pond Dam by conveyance, by virtue of the Lake Preservation Act, or otherwise. Summary judgment for the Association was therefore error.
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Sullivan, Justice.
600 Land, Inc. is the owner of land in Marion County on which it wants to build a "solid waste transfer station." The County contends that a special exception from the zoning ordinance is required. The land is zoned to permit a "motor truck terminal" to be operated without a special use permit. 600 Land’s proposed use qualifies as a "motor truck terminal" because "[a] terminal may include facilities for the temporary storage of loads prior to transshipment."
Conclusion (slip op. at 10): The judgment of the trial court that 600 Land is required to obtain a special use permit for its transfer station is reversed.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 9): In summary, the term "loads" in the definition of "motor truck terminal" is not limited by the preceding term "goods." The loads of waste to be hauled in and out of 600 Land’s proposed waste transfer station by its collection trucks fit into this common meaning of "loads." 600 Land’s proposed use qualifies as a "motor truck terminal" because "[a] terminal may include facilities for the temporary storage of loads prior to transshipment." 600 Land’s proposed waste transfer station is a permitted use under the IZO without a special exception.
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson and Rucker, JJ., concur.
Boehm, J., dissents with separate opinion in which Dickson J., concurs: "I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that a waste transfer facility is a "motor truck terminal" requiring no special exception under the applicable zoning ordinance. To reach this conclusion the majority parses various provisions of the governing ordinance and cites a number of rules of statutory construction, but in my view fails to deal with those that are central to this case . . . "
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Dickson, Justice.
The plaintiff Debra A. Barnett is seeking damages from the defendant Camille Clark, Trustee of Pleasant Township in Steuben County, Indiana, for the conduct constituting rape, sexual battery, and false imprisonment committed by one of the Trustee's employees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant Trustee, and the Court of Appeals reversed. In appealing the grant of summary judgment, the plaintiff has contended that that the Trustee may be held vicariously liable for its employee's actions under the theory of respondeat superior for wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment. She argues that summary judgment is improper because some of the employee's acts were authorized, and thus the question of whether the employee's injurious acts to the plaintiff, even if unauthorized, were nevertheless within the scope of employment, is a jury question. In response, the defendant Trustee contends that, because the employee's authorized job duties did not involve any physical contact with the plaintiff, the Trustee is not vicariously liable as a matter of law for acts clearly outside the scope of employment.
Conclusion (slip op. at 6): We affirm the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment to the defendant, Camille Clark, Trustee of Pleasant Township, Steuben County, Indiana.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 6): We conclude here that the injurious actions of the deputy trustee were not sufficiently associated with his employment duties so as to fall within the scope of the deputy's employment by the defendant Trustee . . . Other than perhaps a greeting handshake, the employee was not explicitly or impliedly authorized to touch or confine applicants for assistance. His alleged acts of confining, sexually touching, and raping the plaintiff were not an extension of authorized physical con-tact. Such acts were not incidental to nor sufficiently associated with the deputy trustee's authorized duties. They did not further his employer's business. And they were not motivated to any extent by his employer's interests.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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UNPUBLISHED
Luiz Alves ("Alves") appeals the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Old National Bank f/k/a St. Joseph Capital Bank ("Old National"). Alves raises three issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as: Whether the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for Old National.
Conclusion (slip op. at 8): Old National designated evidence supporting a prima facie showing that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact. Alves therefore could not rest upon his mere allegations, but was required to designate evidence that he gave the required written notice to Old National, that Old National owed him a duty and that it caused the termination of his employment and/or his removal from MEG. To the contrary, Alves asserted without clear evidentiary support that he gave constructive notice of his claim to Old National. His designated evidence established only that Old National loaned him money and that he agreed to repay it. No duty arose and therefore no duty was breached. For these reasons, we conclude that the entry of summary judgment was proper.
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Surjit Singh, M.D., appeals from the trial court’s grant of a Motion to Correct Error filed by the plaintiffs below, Diane Lyday, Betsy Calderhead, and Cara Nichols (referred to collectively as the "Patients"). In granting this motion, the trial court vacated the jury’s verdict in favor of Singh on the Patients’ claims of malpractice, gross negligence, and battery, and ordered a new trial. On appeal, Singh argues that the trial court improperly granted this motion and improperly denied his motion for a judgment on the evidence. Concluding the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a new trial and that the trial court improperly denied Singh’s motion for judgment on the evidence on the Patients’ claims of malpractice and gross negligence, we reverse and remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment on the evidence in favor of Singh on the malpractice and gross negligence claims and reinstate the jury’s verdict on the battery charge.
Conclusion (slip op. at 31-32): We conclude the trial court improperly denied Singh’s motion for judgment on the evidence on the Patients’ claims for medical malpractice and gross negligence. We therefore remand with instructions that the trial court enter judgment on the evidence in favor of Singh on these claims. We also conclude the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial based on its decisions to exclude evidence at trial. We therefore remand with instructions that the trial court reinstate the jury’s verdict in favor of Singh on the Patients’ claim for battery. The issue of newly discovered evidence raised in the Patients’ motion to correct errors, which the trial court may address on remand, does not affect the insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial to support the Patients’ claims of medical malpractice and gross negligence. Therefore, if the trial court chooses to grant the Patients’ motion to correct error based on their claim of newly discovered evidence, it should order a new trial on only their battery claim. Reversed and remanded.
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UNPUBLISHED
Jesse Sutton ("Sutton") appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motions for directed verdict and to correct error in a personal injury action brought against him by Robert and Julia Gardner. The issue in the case is: Whether the trial court erred in denying his motions.
Conclusion (slip op. at 18): We find that the jury’s award was not excessive and, further, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 15-16, 17-18): We find that Julia presented evidence that could support a jury determination that she had suffered loss of consortium and was entitled to an award of damages. In light of Julia’s testimony as to the various practical and emotional adjustments that resulted from the accident, we find sufficient probative evidence to support the jury’s award to Julia, and that there exist several bases . . . upon which the jury’s award can be explained. Thus, we cannot find that the jury’s award was excessive. Nor do we find that the trial court’s denial of Sutton’s motion to correct error, with regard to Julia’s verdict, was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion . . . We find that Robert presented reasonable sufficient evidence that could support a jury determination that he suffered damages considerably in excess of his medical specials. Robert and his witnesses testified at length that his employment and personal relationships were negatively affected by the accident. We find ample proper bases upon which the jury’s award can be explained.
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Upon petition for rehearing, appellees and cross-appellants Governmental Insurance Managers, Inc. (GIM) and Governmental Interinsurance Exchange (GIE) ask us to supplement our decision in Knightstown Banner, LLC v. Town of Knightstown, 882 N.E.2d 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), in which we resolved several issues, one of which concerned an award of attorney fees. GIE and GIM were aligned with the Town of Knightstown (the Town) as appellees in an appeal from an order proclaiming them jointly and severally liable for an award of attorney fees to the Knightstown Banner (the Newspaper). Those attorney fees stemmed from the Newspaper’s successful lawsuit concerning its request under the Indiana Access to Public Records Act (APRA) to view the settlement agreement between the Town and a former employee (the employee) in a civil rights lawsuit filed by the employee. We write here to address the question whether GIE and GIM, which must be viewed as a single entity for our purposes here, should share joint and several liability with the Town for attorney fees and costs.
Conclusion (slip op. at 5): The trial court did not err in imposing joint and several liability upon GIE and GIM with respect to the award of attorney fees and costs.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 5): The significant factor here is the close relationship between the Town and GIE and GIM with respect to this litigation. Along with the Town, GIE and GIM actively sought to prevent disclosure of the settlement agreement, which in turn triggered the Newspaper’s lawsuit.
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Dickson, Justice.
In seeking dissolution of their marriage, the husband and wife each declared that there were four children born of their marriage, and each requested both temporary and permanent custody of all four children from the dissolution court. But while the dissolution case was pending in Adams Circuit Court, the wife initiated a separate paternity action in Wells Circuit Court and obtained a final order establishing that another man was the biological father of one of these children and granting her custody of that child. The wife then sought to use the paternity judgment as a basis to dismiss in the dissolution case all custody proceedings regarding said child. Following a contested final hearing, the Adams Circuit Court ordered the marriage dissolved, divided the marital property, awarded the husband custody of all four children, and ordered child support. The Court of Appeals, in a memorandum decision, vacated the portions of the dissolution decree pertaining to the said child but affirmed the award of custody of the three other children to the husband. Huss v. Huss, 01C01-0504-DR-37 (July 25, 2007). We granted transfer and now affirm the dissolution court's custody determination.
Conclusion (slip op. at 14): Having previously granted transfer, we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals determination of the wife's appellate allegations of improper denial of her Trial Rule 53.1 request and of fundamental unfairness and violation of due process. Finding that the dissolution court was authorized to determine the custody of all four children of the parties' marriage, including the child whose paternity was separately found to be in a man other than the husband, and that the wife has failed to establish that evidence failed to support the findings and judgment of the dissolution court, we affirm the dissolution and custody judgment of the Adams Circuit Court.
Shepard, C.J., and Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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Burns-Kish Funeral Homes, Inc., Thomas J. Burns, and Jean Burns (collectively "Plaintiffs") now appeal the trial court’s denial of their Verified Application for Preliminary Injunction against Kish Funeral Homes, LLC, Kevin Kish, and Patricia Kish (collectively "Defendants") and the appointment of a custodian over Burns-Kish pending a hearing on Patricia Kish’s Counter-Claim for Judicial Dissolution of Burns-Kish. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that because Kevin Kish was an officer of Burns-Kish, he owed a fiduciary duty to the corporation and that he breached that duty when he made plans to open his own funeral home, Kish Funeral and Cremation Services; that the trial court erred in not considering evidence that Kish Funeral and Cremation Services would cause confusion and irreparable harm to Burns-Kish; and that the trial court erred in appointing a custodian over Burns-Kish because it cited the wrong statute.
Conclusion (slip op. at 20): The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction and properly appointed a custodian over Burns-Kish pending a hearing on Patricia’s counter-claim for judicial dissolution of Burns-Kish. Affirmed.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 13, 17, 20): As an employee, Kevin was not precluded from using information, knowledge, or skills gained during his employment with Burns-Kish and was allowed to make arrangements to compete before leaving Burns-Kish. Without an employment agreement, Kevin is free to compete with his former employer . . . The court was entitled to determine that there was no confusion, particularly because there are other funeral homes in Lake County with Burns in the name . . . The court properly appointed a custodian over Burns-Kish to preserve the corporate assets and to carry on the business . . . appointment of a custodian is especially appropriate given the evidence of Thomas’s history of making unauthorized and unequal distributions to himself.
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Thomas J. Herr appeals the trial court’s judgment in his action against Carter Lumber, Inc., the Carter Jones Lumber Company (collectively, "Carter Lumber"), and Brian Oaks for unpaid attorney fees. Herr raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court’s order that Herr receive his compensation under a contingency fee agreement only after Carter Lumber makes a recovery is clearly erroneous.
Conclusion (slip op. at 9): We affirm the trial court’s judgment that Herr is entitled to recover his quantum meruit fee on any collection achieved by successor attorneys.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 8): Here, the contingency fee agreement did not contain a termination clause. Thus, Herr should receive his attorney fees pursuant to the contingency fee agreement only when Carter Lumber receives payment . . . Moreover, although Herr seeks to receive compensation based upon his hourly fee and the number of hours that he worked on each case, that result would be inconsistent with Galanis. Under Galanis, the terminated attorney receives compensation based upon the "contribution of the discharged lawyer’s efforts to the ultimate result" under quantum meruit.
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Shepard, Chief Justice.
The parties in this case entered into a construction contract providing that in the event of a legal dispute, the prevailing party would be entitled to reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney fees. The term "prevailing party" was not defined. We hold that in the absence of further definition, such a contract produces fees only when one party or the other wins a judgment.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 4): It seems unlikely that parties entering into a contract would intend for a settlement reached during mediation to result in either party obtaining prevailing party status . . . Aside from the dictionary and case law on which we rely, it seems apparent that the bright line approach these represent is the best for most litigants. The worst approach would be one in which "prevailing party" is treated with ambiguity or discretion, provoking litigation about who won the litigation, in addition to litigation over the appropriate amount of fees.
Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, and Rucker, JJ., concur.
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UNPUBLISHED
Appellant-Respondent Alfred Dartis appeals the trial court’s judgment granting a petition for judicial review brought by Appellee-Petitioner Delco Remy America, Inc. ("DRA") and reversing the finding of the Anderson Human Relations Commission ("AHRC") that DRA’s termination of Dartis’s employment was due to unlawful discriminatory practices. Upon appeal, Dartis claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the AHRC’s finding was not supported by substantial evidence and was contrary to law.
Conclusion (slip op. at 9): Because both parties agree, and the trial court found, that the AHRC hearing was invalid for lack of a quorum, we reverse the trial court’s judgment in favor of DRA and remand to the trial court with instructions to remand this cause to the AHRC for a new hearing with a sufficient quorum.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 9): The trial court’s judgment is based upon an incomplete record missing an unknown amount of witness testimony which may or may not have supported Dartis’s claim. Its reversal of the AHRC’s determination of discrimination was therefore in error.
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Paula Yates appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Edinburgh Community School Corporation ("School Corporation") in her personal injury negligence action against the School Corporation and others. The restated issues before us are:
I. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that School Corporation owed no duty to Yates; and
II. Whether Yates was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Conclusion (slip op. at 16): The trial court erred in concluding that School Corporation owed no duty to Yates. Furthermore, Yates was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law. We reverse the grant of summary judgment in favor of School Corporation.
Key Analysis (slip op. at 14, 16): School Corporation did owe a duty to Yates, specifically with respect to the injuring instrumentality in this case, the stairs. Moreover, there is a question of fact as to whether Yates was at School Hill at the School Corporation’s express or implied invitation. Thus, the alleged obviousness of any defects in the stairs does not automatically absolve the School Corporation of liability for Yates’s injuries . . . Although Yates may have been aware of some potential dangers associated with the stairs, she was not per se negligent in using them.
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