Appellate Case Law Archives

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Shepard, Chief Justice.

The question here is whether a property owner’s claim for contribution toward environmental cleanup costs is barred by the statute of limitation if the owner should have known about the contamination more than ten years before the complaint was filed. We hold that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the owner is ordered to cleanup the property, regardless of whether an owner earlier knew or should have known about the need for cleanup.

Conclusion (slip op. at 7):  We reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings on the merits.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 5, 6, 7):  Because the damage at issue in the Pflanzes’ contribution claim is the cleanup obligation assessed by IDEM that resulted from Foster’s use of the land, the statute of limitation did not begin to accrue until after the Pflanzes were ordered to clean up the property. Accordingly, because IDEM ordered the Pflanzes to pay for the environmental cleanup costs in 2001, the Pflanzes filed their contribution claim well within the ten-year statute of limitation . . . The Pflanzes’ claim for stigma damages cannot possibly have been outside the statute of limitation period. The Pflanzes first incurred cleanup costs in 2001 and filed their claim in 2006 . . . We cannot accept the trial court’s holding that, as a matter of law, the passage of the USTA automatically put landowners on notice that they should inspect and monitor any underground storage tanks on their property even if the former property owners had assured them the tanks were closed and not in use.

Dickson, Sullivan, Boehm, Rucker, JJ., concur.

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UNPUBLISHED

Kelly Trucking, Inc. ("Kelly Trucking"), appeals a decision by the Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development ("Board") granting unemployment benefits to Bradley S. Wilson. Kelly Trucking raises two issues, which we revise and restate as whether the Board’s determination that Wilson was not terminated for good cause was reasonable.

Conclusion (slip op. at 9): We affirm the Board’s decision that Wilson was not discharged for just cause.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 7-8, 9):  Kelly Trucking’s [two] arguments are merely request[s] that we reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we cannot do.

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Community Hospitals of Indiana, Inc. ("Community"), appeals from the denial of its motion to dismiss Janice S. Vitatoe’s complaint against ProCare Rehab Services of Community Hospital ("ProCare") for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

Conclusion (slip op. at 12):  We reverse the denial of Community’s motion to dismiss Vitatoe’s proposed medical malpractice complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 10):  If an employee’s injury that arose out of and in the course of her employment is aggravated by treatment for that injury, regardless of where, when, by whom, and for how long the treatment was provided, the injury caused by the treatment shall be deemed as a matter of law to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment for purposes of the IWCA. As such, the employee’s exclusive remedy against her employer for the injury caused by the treatment is under the IWCA.

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Shepard, Chief Justice.

LaFief filed for unemployment. An administrative law judge held that he was not entitled to unemployment benefits, reasoning that LaFief was not "discharged" because his employment ended at the expiration of his contract term. The Review Board of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development reversed, finding that ISU’s decision not to reappoint LaFief equated to a "discharge." The Court of Appeals reversed the board, holding that LaFief was not entitled to unemployment benefits because he had voluntarily agreed to a one-year appointment that expired by its own terms and that he was not "discharged" from his employment when he was not reappointed. The issue is whether a university professor who agreed to a fixed-term employment contract was entitled to unemployment benefits upon the non-renewal of his contract.

Conclusion (slip op. at 5):  We hold that the professor was not voluntarily unemployed and is entitled to benefits. We affirm the Review Board’s decision.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 4):  The fact that LaFief had warning that his employment could terminate upon the contract’s expiration does not change the fact that at the end of the year he became unemployed. The termination of his employment was no more voluntary than the termination of employment of an employee at will, who is presumably on notice that his employment could terminate at any time.

Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.

Dickson, J., dissents with separate opinion, in which Rucker, J., concurs:  . . . [b]ecause I conclude that Professor LaFief had no employment to leave or from which to be discharged, and further that he is personally accountable and responsible for the natural consequences of his agreement to the fixed-term contract, I would reverse the decision of the Review Board.

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UNPUBLISHED

Neil Smith appeals from the trial court’s order following a bench trial. Specifically, Smith contends that the trial court erred in granting Rachelle Liddil’s complaint seeking specific performance of a real estate purchase agreement and denying his counterclaim for foreclosure.

Conclusion (slip op. at 4):  Here, the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination is Liddil’s testimony that Smith "was paid in full." Additionally, the Final Report and Accounting provided by Liddil established that all of her creditors, including Smith, had been paid. In light of the evidence supporting Liddil’s claim that Smith had been paid in full, we conclude that the judgment of the trial court was not erroneous. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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Per Curiam.

This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties. We find that Respondent, Douglas W. Patterson, engaged in attorney misconduct by his conversion of client funds, deceit in concealing his misconduct, and dishonesty with the Disciplinary Commission.

Conclusion (slip op. at 6):  Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a), Rule 8.4(b), and Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. For this professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less than three years, beginning July 31, 2008.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 4):  Respondent's justification of his withdrawal of funds from the Trust Account is that he believed the firm owed him additional compensation and that one check was repayment of a loan. Yet he took the funds out secretly, did not use the established procedure for taking funds out of the Trust Account, took steps to conceal the withdrawals, and initially lied to his partner about writing the checks. His actions are not consistent with how a partner would assert a claim for additional compensation from his firm . . . We also find that the hearing officer did not improperly presume the converted funds were client funds and thus shift to Respondent the burden of proving they were not . . . even if some of the funds in the Trust Account were not client funds, it does not change the character of Respondent's withdrawals. They still constitute conversion, only from the firm or a third party other than clients.

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Appellant-respondent Michael Lukis appeals the trial court’s order determining that the way in which the Indiana Natural Resources Commission (NRC) evaluated the parties’ respective riparian rights was contrary to law and remanding the matter for reconsideration. Lukis argues that in arriving at that result, the trial court overstepped its authority on judicial review of an administrative action.

Conclusion (slip op. at 15): The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 12, 13):  The Nosek apportionment method would be a perfectly appropriate way to solve the parties’ dispute, but this method has never been adopted as a fixed rule in Indiana. The trial court, therefore, erroneously concluded that the NRC’s failure to follow the Nosek rule was contrary to law . . . That there may have been other results that would, likewise, have been equitable does not mean that the NRC arrived at a result that was erroneous or contrary to law. Nothing in the NRC’s decision warrants second-guessing from the judicial system.

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For many years, Indiana counties have been required to pay a portion of the cost of operating juvenile detention facilities. When the State attempted to collect a combined arrearage of approximately $75 million from Marion and St. Joseph Counties, the Counties filed a lawsuit seeking relief from their debts. The trial court entered summary judgment for the State.

Conclusion (slip op. at 19):  The Counties have standing to assert their claims, and their claims are not barred by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches. However, we conclude the trial court correctly decided the merits of the Counties’ claims, and we affirm.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 7, 13, 18):  The Counties have a stake in the $75 million at issue in this case. This sum represents a bona fide dispute between adverse parties. Therefore, we conclude the trial court erred by holding the Counties lacked standing . . . We conclude the Counties have not overcome the presumption the statutes requiring them to share in the cost of operating juvenile facilities are constitutional . . . We conclude the DOC had authority to charge the Counties for expenses incurred at all facilities.

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The Board of Commissioners of LaPorte County ("LaPorte County"), the Board of Commissioners of Porter County ("Porter County"), the Town of Beverly Shores ("Beverly Shores"), and the Town of Pines ("Pines") (collectively, "Appellants") appeal the trial court’s affirmation of an order by the Office of Environmental Adjudication ("OEA") in favor of Great Lakes Transfer, LLC ("Great Lakes Transfer"), and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management ("IDEM"). Appellants raise four issues, which we revise and restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by transferring venue to Marion County;
2. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the OEA’s decision that IDEM properly granted a permit to Great Lakes Transfer even though Great Lakes Transfer did not have a permit for road access was not arbitrary and capricious;
3. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the OEA’s decision that IDEM properly granted a permit when Great Lakes Transfer did not own the property at issue was not arbitrary and capricious;
4. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the OEA’s decision that IDEM properly granted a permit when Great Lakes Transfer’s building permit was later rescinded was not arbitrary and capricious;
5. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the OEA’s decision that IDEM properly granted a permit despite wetlands concerns was not arbitrary and capricious; and
6. Whether the trial court erred in determining that the OEA’s decision that IDEM properly granted a permit despite concerns of environmental justice and public participation was not arbitrary and capricious.

Conclusion (slip op. at 31):  Trial court's order affirmed in all respects.
 

Key Analysis (slip op. at 16, 22, 26, 28, 31):  We agree with the trial court that, given the relevant regulations, the OEA’s affirmation of IDEM’s interpretation of the rule allowing the issuance of the permit without confirmation of the Driveway Permit is reasonable . . . Given regulations in 329 IAC 11, the OEA concluded that IDEM’s issuance of the permit was proper, and the trial court concluded that OEA’s decision was reasonable. We agree . . . The issuance of the permit by IDEM does not preempt any duty to comply with other state or local requirements. GLT still had the duty to obtain a valid special exception and building permit. We conclude that the OEA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious . . . GL did submit a wetlands delineation report to IDEM, that the transfer station construction would not impact wetlands, and that the issuance of a permit would not authorize an impact on wetlands or authorize the discharge of pollutants into the waters. Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the OEA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious . . . Appellants presented no evidence to the OEA that the proposed solid waste transfer facility would have an environmental impact. Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the OEA’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.

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Plaintiff-Appellant MBNA America Bank, N.A. ("MBNA") appeals from the trial court’s order denying and dismissing with prejudice its application to confirm an arbitration award against Defendant-Appellee Aaron Kay. MBNA presents several issues for our review; however, the following issue is dispositive:  Whether the trial court erred by dismissing, with prejudice, MBNA’s application to confirm the arbitration award.

Conclusion (slip op. at 7):  The trial court did not err by dismissing MBNA’s application to confirm the arbitration award. Once Kay objected to the arbitration, MBNA was required by the FAA to obtain a federal court ruling regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement. Affirmed.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 7):  The FAA provided that upon Kay’s objection to the arbitration, MBNA was required to petition a federal court for a determination regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement. This was not done. Instead, the NAF attempted to rule on the validity of the arbitration agreement at issue. As a result, the award MBNA sought to confirm was void, or incapable of confirmation or ratification. The trial court’s order was not erroneous to the extent that it, in essence, vacated the arbitration award.

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Rucker, Justice.

The question raised in this opinion is whether a marriage solemnized in another state in violation of that state’s law may be recognized as valid in this state if the marriage complies with this state’s law. The answer is yes.

Conclusion (slip op. at 8):  The trial court granted McCardle’s motion to dismiss based on the lack of standing. We affirm the judgment of the trial court albeit on a different theory.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.

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James Kohlmeyer appeals the Indiana Worker’s Compensation Board’s (the Board’s) denial of Kohlmeyer’s petition for payment of benefits from Indiana’s Second Injury Fund. The following issue is dispositive of the appeal: Do Social Security disability benefits count toward the threshold amount of benefits that must be received in order to become eligible for benefits from the Second Injury Fund?

Conclusion (slip op. at 11):  We conclude that the threshold requirement regarding benefits received, as set out in I.C. § 22-3-3-13(h)(2), must be met by considering only Worker’s Compensation benefits. The arguments to the contrary made on behalf of Kohlmeyer are . . . more properly addressed to the General Assembly, inasmuch as they constitute appeals to modify the statute to include benefits from other sources in reaching the threshold. As it currently exists, the statute permits no such interpretation. We also conclude that the Stipulation signed by Kohlmeyer and H.B. Zachry Company and approved by the Board did not include a guarantee that Kohlmeyer would be eligible for Second Injury Fund benefits. Accordingly, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

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Swan Lake Holdings, LLC ("Swan Lake"), appeals the denial of its motion for judgment on the evidence and the jury’s verdict finding it thirty-five percent at fault on the premises liability complaint filed by Dean and Denielle Hiles. Swan Lake raises three issues, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment on the evidence;

II. Whether Swan Lake waived its claim that the trial court abused its discretion in giving jury instruction number five; and

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in giving jury instruction number six.

Conclusion (slip op. at 11, 12, 15):  We conclude that the trial court properly denied Swan Lake’s motion for judgment on the evidence . . . We conclude that Swan Lake has waived its argument on jury instruction number five . . . We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by giving instruction number six.  Affirmed.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 9-10):  We conclude that there is evidence upon which reasonable people could conclude that Swan Lake knew or by the exercise of reasonable care would have discovered that the Overhang had been leaking for over a year, which would indicate that a dangerous condition existed with respect to the Overhang. Accordingly, the evidence here was sufficient under the jury instructions to support each element of the Hileses’ claim.

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Appellant-plaintiff Martha S. Pressley appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of appellees-defendants Newburgh Town Council (Town Council) and Town of Newburgh Historical Preservation Council (Preservation Council) (collectively, the Town). Specifically, Pressley argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to strike an affidavit that the Town presented in support of its motion for summary judgment regarding the inclusion of her property in a historic preservation district (HPD). Moreover, Pressley claims that the designated evidence established as a matter of law that the Town failed to comply with several statutory requirements before determining that her property could be included in an HPD.

Conclusion (slip op. at 12):  Pressley has failed to show that the Town erred in designating her property as an HPD, and we conclude that the trial court properly granted the Town’s motion for summary judgment.  Affirmed.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 11-12):  The HPC followed the requisite statutory procedures in considering the property for inclusion in an HPD, and recommended to the Town Council that Pressley’s property be designated as such. The evidence contained in the record, including the Report, Hijuelos’s survey and on-site inspections, the maps adopted by the HPC, and the minutes of the meetings, supported the Town’s determination that Pressley’s property is of outstanding historic and architectural merit.

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Old Republic Insurance Company ("Old Republic") appeals the trial court’s order denying Old Republic’s motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to RLI Insurance Company ("RLI"), The Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania ("ISOP"), First Specialty Insurance Corporation ("First Specialty"), and Debra Boboruzian. Old Republic raises two issues for our review, which we restate as the following issue: whether I.C. 27-8-9-9 (Indiana’s "Lease Statute") may be applied to determine the priority of insurance coverage between a primary insurance policy and true excess policies.

Conclusion (slip op. at 17): In sum, we hold that I.C. 27-8-9-9 applies only to determine the priority of coverage between or among policies affording the same level of coverage. Here, the Old Republic Policy provides primary coverage, while the RLI Excess Policy, the ISOP Umbrella Policy, and the First Specialty Excess Policy each offer true excess coverage. Thus, the Lease Statute cannot be applied to prioritize the Excess Insurers’ policies ahead of the Old Republic Policy. The trial court did not err in holding that I.C. 27-8-9-9 is inapplicable to Old Republic’s declaratory judgment action and in granting summary judgment to the Excess Insurers. Affirmed.

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Henry C. Woodward appeals the trial court’s orders in favor of Heritage Construction Company’s ("Heritage’s") action to foreclose on a mechanic’s lien and request for attorney’s fees and costs. Woodward also appeals the court’s denial of his motion to amend the pleadings to conform with the evidence. Woodward raises three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Woodward’s request to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, which would have permitted Woodward to argue an otherwise unraised affirmative defense.

2. Whether the court’s finding that Heritage’s mechanic’s lien had been timely filed was clearly erroneous.

3. Whether the court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence pertaining to Heritage’s attorney’s fees.

Conclusion (slip op. at 13-14):  In sum, the trial court did not err in denying Woodward’s Motion to Amend, in finding Heritage’s notice of its intention to hold a mechanic’s lien timely filed, or in permitting Heritage to proceed with evidence of its attorney’s fees even though Heritage had rested its case. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 6, 11):  Woodward was not entitled to conform his pleadings at the end of the trial to add an unlitigated defense under HICA. Amendments of the pleadings to conform to the evidence are permissible only when the parties have consented to and litigated issues not originally raised by the pleadings. Such amendments are not a procedural tool to reopen litigation . . . permitting Heritage to proceed with evidence of its attorney’s fees enabled the court to do justice on the merits of Heritage’s claim against Woodward. And by ordering a separate, later hearing on the issue of attorney’s fees, the court mitigated any surprise or disruption that may have resulted from Heritage’s request.

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Appellant-defendant Cherokee Air Products, Inc., f/k/a Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc., L.P. (Cherokee), appeals the trial court’s order setting aside its previous entry of default against appellee-plaintiff Burlington Insurance Company (Burlington). Cherokee argues that the trial court erred by setting aside the entry of default against Burlington.

Conclusion (slip op. at 10):  Although we do not celebrate Burlington’s inexplicable failure to respond to Cherokee’s counterclaim, given these facts and our general predilection to decide cases on their merits, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by setting aside the entry of default against Burlington and entering final judgment in its favor. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 6-7):  Where, as here, a trial court enters a default on liability but not on damages, the order is not a final judgment such that Rule 60(B) applies. Instead, under these circumstances, if the party who has been defaulted on liability seeks to have the trial court revisit its default order, the party should file a motion for reconsideration of what our S.C has dubbed "an interlocutory ruling". In this case, therefore, Cherokee’s appeal should more properly be framed as whether the trial court erred by sua sponte reconsidering its entry of default against Burlington and entering final judgment in Burlington’s favor.

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UNPUBLISHED

Appellants Michael Glant and Eileen Glant (collectively, "the Glants") appeal an order of the Marion Superior Court providing that they are liable for attorney’s fees attributable to deception in a real estate transaction with Thomas Bovis and Elizabeth Vogel-Bovis (collectively, "the Bovises").

The Glants present six issues for review, which we consolidate and restate as the following issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that the Glants, acting with intent to defraud, misrepresented property as suitable for a building site, so as to establish a deception claim under Indiana Code Section 35-43-5-3 and support the award of statutory attorney’s fees for a crime victim.

Conclusion (slip op. at 9):  The order for rescission and consequential damages is affirmed; the order for attorney’s fees is reversed.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 8, 9):  Even if the Glants made technically false representations, there is a dearth of evidence that they knew the representations to be false. Moreover, the CVA contemplates an award of attorney’s fees only when the claimant has suffered pecuniary loss "as a result of" a violation of one of the enumerated statutes . . . the Bovises’ failure to insist on current soil tests, by merely checking an appropriate box on a pre-printed real estate form, is a contributing cause of their own injuries, [thus] the trial court erroneously awarded attorney's fees to the Bovises under the CVA.

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Boehm, Justice.

This case presents two issues of first impression. We hold that under some circumstances a minor’s invitation to enter the premises may bind the landowner for purposes of premises liability, and that a trampoline may constitute an attractive nuisance. In this case both issues turn on facts not appropriately resolved on summary judgment.

Conclusion (slip op. at 8):  The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is reversed. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 5, 7, 8):  [T]he reasonableness of twelve-year-old Alisha’s belief that she had permission to jump on the Barger’s trampoline by virtue of six-year-old Bryan’s invitation . . . presents a genuine issue of material fact that precludes a determination of her status as a matter of law . . . the Bargers have not established a lack of disputed material facts with regard to the open and obvious nature to Alisha of the dangers of trampolines . . . by leaving Bryan alone in the yard, the Bargers increased the risk of unauthorized use of the trampoline by another child . . . the Bargers have failed to establish a lack of disputed material facts as to the foreseeability of Alisha’s injury.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan, and Rucker, JJ., concur.

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Robert Reich, who had a remainder interest in a property, and Lincoln Hills Christian Church, Inc. entered into a written agreement for the exchange of two properties. Reich’s mother, who had a life estate in the property, did not sign the agreement. When the church did not follow through with the agreement, Reich sued for specific performance, and Lincoln Hills filed a motion to dismiss. Reich now appeals the trial court’s Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal of his complaint.

Conclusion (slip op. at 2):  Because the written agreement neither describes with reasonable certainty each party and the land nor states with reasonable certainty the terms and conditions of the promises and by whom the promises were made in violation of Indiana’s Statute of Frauds, we affirm the dismissal of Reich’s complaint.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 7):  Because the written agreement does not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds, the trial court’s error in failing to convert Lincoln Hills’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment and in failing to consider Mary’s affidavit is harmless.