Indiana Contract Law

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Progressive Halcyon Insurance Company ("Progressive") appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of the motions for summary judgment filed by Michael Petty and Autumn Petty on the issue of whether Michael and Autumn are entitled to underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage under Autumn’s policy with Progressive ("the Policy").

Issue:  Are Michael and Autumn entitled to UIM coverage under the Policy?

Conclusion (slip op. at 17):  We conclude that Michael and Autumn are not entitled to UIM coverage under the Policy. Therefore, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment in Progressive’s favor.  Reversed and remanded. 
 

Key Analysis (slip op. at 16, 17):  We conclude that the $50,000 threshold mentioned in I.C. 27-7-5-2(a) refers only to the $50,000 per-accident limits mentioned in I.C. 9-25-4-5 and that the minimum per-person UIM coverage is $25,000 . . . we conclude that [the] Policy does not provide less coverage than required by Indiana [law] . . . . although I.C. 27-7-5-4 is a full-recovery statute, "a full-recovery statute will not necessarily assure full indemnification for all potential damage to all potential insureds.

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UNPUBLISHED

Rubertha Johnson and 317 other former employees of Guide Corporation (collectively, the "Employees") appeal the trial court’s grant of Guide’s motion for summary judgment and denial of their motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Employees raise four issues, one of which we find dispositive and restate as whether the trial court properly concluded the Labor Management Relations Act (the "LMRA") preempted the Employees’ claims for liquidated damages and attorney fees under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute.

Conclusion (slip op. at 14):  The trial court properly concluded that section 301 of the LMRA preempts the Employees’ claims for liquidated damages and attorney fees under the Indiana Wage Payment Statute. Accordingly, we affirm and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. On remand, the trial court should determine whether the CBA’s grievance and arbitration procedures apply to the Employees’ claims pursuant to federal labor law and, if so, whether the Employees failed to exhaust those procedural remedies.  Affirmed and remanded.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 5, 8, 13):  Section 301 of the LRMA has complete preemptive force, which means that it will displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . preemption also applies where the state law claim, though not alleging violation of a collective bargaining agreement, nevertheless requires interpretation of one . . . section 301 preemption still applies if the claims are substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA . . . We conclude the Employees’ claims are substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA.

UNPUBLISHED

Tri-Quality Enterprises, Inc. d/b/a Rhino Linings of Fort Wayne ("Rhino Linings") appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Total Systems Technology, Inc. ("TST"), and its shareholders, Charles Piscatelli and Dorothy Piscatelli, on Rhino Linings’ third-party claims of breach of contract, common law indemnity, and fraud, as well as the trial court’s denial of Rhino Linings’ motion for summary judgment on its breach of contract claim. On appeal, Rhino Linings raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court properly granted TST summary judgment on Rhino Linings’ claims of breach of contract, common law indemnity, and fraud.

Conclusion (slip op. at 17): The trial court properly granted TST summary judgment on Rhino Linings’ breach of contract claim, but improperly granted TST summary judgment on Rhino Linings’ common law indemnity and fraud claims.

Key Analysis (slip op. at 17): Indiana law provides that although an integration clause generally results in application of the parol evidence rule, an exception exists where the parol evidence "is not being offered to vary the terms of the written contract, and to show that fraud, intentional misrepresentation, or mistake entered into the formation of a contract." Thus, the parole evidence rule does not apply to prevent Rhino Linings from introducing extrinsic evidence on its fraud claim.