Indiana Contract

A negligence claim against CVS Pharmacy and one of its pharmacists was allowed to go forward in accordance with a ruling by the Indiana Court of Appeals today. The court ruled that a legal duty exists for a pharmacist to warn patients of risks involved with the taking of certain medications.

In Kolozsvari v. John Doe, M.D., No. 32A04-1008-CT-525, the plaintiff was prescribed OsmoPrep, a medication used in preparation for colonoscopies, and took the prescription to CVS to have it filled. While filling the prescription, the pharmacists received a warning screen on the computer stating that, because of the plaintiff’s age, there was a risk involved with prescribing the medication. The pharmacists dismissed the warning and filled the prescription without relaying the warning to the plaintiff. The following day, the plaintiff believed that the medication hadn’t prepared her well enough for the procedure and the doctor advised her to refill the prescription and try it again. She took the second prescription back to the pharmacy and relayed the information that she felt a tingling sensation in her body and asked if it was caused by the medication. The pharmacist said that it was not and refilled the prescription, ignoring a second warning relating to the risk involved with refilling the prescription so quickly. The pharmacy also had access to the plaintiff’s medication history and was on notice that she was routinely taking hypertension medication that is known to conflict with the colonoscopy drug. After taking the medication one more time, the plaintiff awoke the next morning to severe tingling and went to the hospital, which informed her that she had suffered a kidney failure and would need to be on dialysis indefinitely or receive a transplant.

In a negligence action against her doctor, nurse, CVS, and the pharmacist individually, the trial court granted summary judgment against the plaintiff, stating that there existed no duty of the pharmacist to warn patients of medication risks. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, stating that “CVS and [the pharmacist] had a duty of care to [the plaintiff] either to warn [her] of the side effects of OsmoPrep or to withhold the medication in accordance with Indiana Code section 25-26-13-16 and Pharmacy Board rule 1-33-2.” The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

In Beneficial Indiana, Inc. v. Joy Properties, LLC, No. 02A05-1005-PL-260, the Indiana Court of Appeals held a mortgagee’s interest in defaulted property to be superior to that of a quitclaim deed beneficiary.

In 2003, Beneficial Indiana was granted a security interest by an executed mortgage relating to real estate owned by Ronald and Cheryl Osten. In 2008, after the Ostens failed to pay property taxes, Allen County held an auction sale to recoup the tax dollars owed. The Ostens failed to exercise their rights to reclaim the property before the expiration of a one-year redemption period, leaving a surplus of $42,462.20. After Beneficial Indiana filed a motion asking for the surplus funds to be held pending court action, citing the Osten’s defaulted mortgage, the Ostens executed a quitclaim deed to Joy Properties granting them their interest to the property.

In an action between the two parties, the court explained that Beneficial Indiana’s security interest in the property was extinguished by the tax sale, but then followed the proceeds and attached to the surplus money. The deed executed by the Ostens only granted Joy Properties an interest in the real estate subject to Beneficial Indiana’s mortgage lien, meaning the surplus should have been given to Beneficial Indiana to satisfy the defaulted mortgage.

When a plaintiff alleges enhanced injury as a result of a product’s design, the Indiana Supreme Court held in Green v. Ford Motor Co., No. 94S00-1007-CQ-348, that the fact-finder can only apportion fault to the injured party if the fact-finder concludes that the fault of the injured party is “a proximate cause of the harm for which damages are being sought.” 

The decision comes from the court’s consideration of a lawsuit filed by Nicholas Green against Ford Motor Co. arising out of an accident in which Green’s car hit a guardrail before flipping down an embankment, leaving Green as a quadriplegic. He argued that his 1999 Ford Explorer’s defective and unreasonably dangerous design caused the injuries, while Ford responded that his own negligence contributed to the car’s leaving the road in the first place.

The court accepted review from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana to resolve the single question of whether “in a crashworthiness case alleging enhanced injuries under the Indiana Products Liability Act, the finder of fact shall apportion fault to the person suffering physical harm when that alleged fault relates to the cause of the underlying accident.” After considering this question, the court answered in the affirmative but restricted the language of the question, requiring the fault to be a proximate cause of the harm for which damages are sought.   There are two collisions in auto accidents, as recognized in cases alleging enhanced injuries as a result of product defectiveness. The first occurs when a plaintiff’s negligence causes him to be caught in an accident. In the context of the case, Green sought relief from the injuries that resulted from the “second collision” of the crash, involving a manufacturer’s failure to exercise reasonable care by designing a defective product. The court’s narrowing of the question means that a plaintiff’s negligence must have contributed to the “second collision” as well as the first in order to be considered by the fact-finder.

The Court of Appeals held last week that a real estate agent representing a buyer in a transaction only owes the selling party a duty of honesty and a duty of not knowingly giving out false information, pursuant to Indiana statutory law.

In Likens v. Prickett’s Properties, Inc., a buyer’s agent in a real estate transaction contacted a seller independently to encourage acceptance of the buyer’s offer. The agent represented to the seller that, although closing would have to wait several months until the buyer was able to secure enough cash for the purchase, the buyer presented a good offer and would make rental payments to the seller on the property until closing. The agent also told the seller that the buyer deposited $10,000 in escrow, which was to be held in the form of a bank letter of guarantee of funds. After closing did not occur by the date specified and the bank letter was determined to be fraudulent, the seller sued the agency, the buyer, and the agent for negligence and fraud.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the real estate agent on both counts, citing Indiana Code § 25-34.1-10-11, which states that a licensee (a real estate agent) representing a buyer “owes no duties or obligations to the seller or landlord except that a licensee shall treat all prospective sellers or landlords honestly and not knowingly give them false information.” The statute also states that the agent bears no responsibility to ensure the financial stability of the buyer. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the granting of summary judgment, explained that because there was no statutory duty owed to the seller, there could be no negligence claim. The seller failed to appeal the summary judgment as it related to the fraud claim, so no further investigation of the agent’s knowledge needed to be conducted.

J.K. Harris, a tax resolution company with several offices in Indiana, lost its ability to argue against a class action suit brought against it by an Indiana resident whose tax issues were not resolved by the company, the Court of Appeals of Indiana held today in J.K. Harris & Co. v. Sandlin, No. 49A05-1003-CT-184.

The rationale behind the forfeiture of argument stems from Harris’s five and a half month absence from the litigation. Harris failed to appear before the court several times before the trial court ordered locks to be placed on the doors of the Indiana locations of the business. 

In an appeal of the court’s denial to set aside default judgment against it, Harris argued that it did not receive adequate notice of the proceedings, even though it was served with the plaintiff’s complaint. The Court of Appeals concluded that because Harris did not raise the argument during trial, it waived any ability to make the argument on appeal. The court similarly dismissed Harris’s claim that the contract signed by the plaintiff stated that any disputes between the parties would be resolved in arbitration. The court held that by ignoring the pending litigation, Harris, in effect, acted as if it was not interested in pursuing the arbitration claim and, therefore, could not stand by the arbitration clause in the contract. The court remanded the case for further class determination, but sided with the plaintiff on all other accounts.

By Steven M. Badger*
email: sbadger@boselaw.com

            The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on January 14, 2011 in a case of first impression that will decide whether a high school athletic association may require media organizations to buy licenses for internet streaming of high school athletic events.

The appellate court is reviewing a lower court decision last June upholding the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (the “Wisconsin Athletic Association”) policies regulating internet streaming of high school tournament events. Two Gannett newspapers in Wisconsin challenged the licensing policy on First Amendment grounds.  

            The Wisconsin licensing scheme at issue requires any media organization to pay a fee ranging from $250 to $1500 for the right to stream video of any tournament event over the internet. The Wisconsin Athletic Association also reserves to itself “sole discretion” to grant such rights without specifying any standards for the exercise of its discretion.

Under the Wisconsin licensing policy, any media organization that pays the licensing fee and receives internet streaming rights must provide a master copy its video to a private company holding exclusive broadcast rights.   That private company then may market the video and the media organization that made the video is entitled to a 20% share of the proceeds as a royalty.

The lower court observed in its June ruling that “ultimately, this case is about commerce, not the right to a Free Press.” Gannett’s appeal however argues that the Wisconsin Athletic Association’s revenue-generating motive does not trump the media’s First Amendment rights.

Gannett also focuses its constitutional arguments on the unrestricted discretion the Wisconsin Athletic Association reserves for itself to grant licenses to media organizations of its choosing. Gannett contends that if the athletic association wishes to pick and choose which media organizations may stream video over the internet, the First Amendment requires it do so on an even-handed basis without any threat of exclusion based on viewpoint.

An array of national media associations and media companies has joined in supporting Gannett’s appeal through the filing of an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief. Those supporting organizations include the Newspaper Association of America, the American Society of News Editors, the National Press Photographers Association and The Online News Association. The supporting media companies include Sun Times Media, LLC and Lee Enterprises, Incorporated, among others.

The Wisconsin Athletic Association is supported by two amicus briefs, one by the National Federation of State High School Associations and the other by 10 state high school associations, including the IHSAA.  

            A decision by the Seventh Circuit is expected this summer or fall. Any of the parties could then seek review by the United States Supreme Court. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals are binding precedent for lower federal courts in the states of Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin.

*Steve Badger is a partner at Bose McKinney & Evans and represents media organizations and journalists in media law and First Amendment matters.

The Indiana Wage Claims Statute and the Indiana Wage Payment Statute are separate laws that address the same issue. The statutes provide the procedure for payment of employees, but are to be used in separate and distinct circumstances, the Court of Appeals held last week.

In Hollis v. Defender Security Co., No. 49A02-1004-PL-464, Robert Hollis filed suit against his former employer for failure to pay wages in a timely fashion. The court said that in circumstances where an employee has been separated from his former employer, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the procedure for a claim is the same. The former employee must file a claim under the Wage Claims Statute with the Department of Labor first and seek remedy from that body rather than filing in the court system right away.

The court held that when a current employee has a claim against his employer, the employee is allowed to file suit in the court system right away and pursue action under the Wage Payment Statute. The reasoning for this decision is to keep frivolous lawsuits by disgruntled former employees out of the court system. Should a former employee’s claim make it through the Department of Labor process, the complaint can then be taken into the courts. Because Hollis was separated from his employment at the time he filed suit, he should have pursued the claim within the Department of Labor and under the Wage Claims Statute, and it was because of this that his case was dismissed.

In a case involving the determination of work bonuses being paid as “wages” under Indiana law, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that in circumstances where the bonuses are not related to the amount of time an employee works, are not guaranteed to be paid regularly, and are not granted based on the employer’s financial success, the bonuses do not fall under the wage classification for purposes of Indiana statutes.

While Orlando Quezare was employed as a collections account representative for Byrider Finance, Inc., his employment agreement called for bonus payments if certain percentages were met, each week, regarding the amount of delinquency on his accounts and also if his team of account reps met certain goals.  After he was terminated, Quezare sued Byrider, alleging that the company violated Indiana law by failing to make wage payments within ten business days of the pay period ending date.  Bose McKinney & Evans attorneys Gregory Guevara and Emily Yates argued successfully that the bonus payments did not constitute wages under the statute.

In the opinion of Quezare v. Byrider Finance, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that, in order for bonus payments to be considered wages under Indiana law, the payments must be directly related to the amount of time an employee works, must be paid to the employee with regularity, and cannot be tied to the financial success of the employer.  Because Quezare’s bonuses were tied only to his individual success, were never guaranteed, and also because Indiana case law doesn’t consider team bonuses to be wages, Byrider was not in violation of Indiana law.

In Sheehan Construction Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 49S02-1001-CV-32, the Court reconsidered its opinion by rehearing a previous decision in which the Court ruled in favor of the insured parties. The question in that case was whether the insurance policy covered faulty workmanship by a subcontractor. The Court ruled that it did, but did not address the timeliness of the insured party’s notice to the insurer.  The Court reopened its opinion in order to address this question.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurers and the Indiana Supreme Court agreed. The Court reasoned that the basis for the timely notice of claims is to allow the insurer ample time to investigate the claim. In circumstances where the insured party fails to give notice in a timely manner, the Court presumes prejudice. The burden then shifts to the insured party to prove that the insurer was not prejudiced by the failure to report. In the case, the insured parties admitted their notice was untimely and because they produced no evidence to support the contention that the insurer was not prejudiced, the Court granted summary judgment for the insurance company.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana upheld the trial court in a decision granting summary judgment in favor of a firefighter who allegedly made malicious comments during the course of fighting a fire.

Terry Hart, Assistant Fire Chief with the Martinsville Fire Department, was overheard by the son of the plaintiff saying “let it burn” while responding in an assisting capacity to a fire in Washington Township. In a complaint against Hart, as an individual and in his capacity with the fire department, and against the Martinsville Fire Department for negligence, the family who owns the burned property alleged that Hart and the fire department didn’t take proper care in ensuring that the property was protected from the fire. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the common law and black letter rule of governmental immunity. 

In the opinion of Ellis v. City of Martinsville, No. 55A01-1003-CT-141, the court determined that the negligence actions against Hart and the city did not have issues of material fact and granted summary judgment for the municipalities. The court sided with the argument that the fire department cannot be held liable for the decisions made by those in charge of its operations and also that the individuals in charge of making those decisions cannot be held liable as long as the decision is made in the course of employment. Because Hart arrived at the scene in firefighting gear and was paid for his time at the fire, he was determined to be acting in his capacity as a firefighter and, thus, was granted immunity from liability to the homeowners.

The Indiana Supreme Court recently held that, in an insurance dispute regarding defense and indemnification of environmental liability, the uniform approach (a single state’s law governing the entire contract) should be applied, and the state with the “most intimate contacts” will have its law pertain to the contract.

Standard Fusee Corporation (“SFC”) previously operated factories manufacturing emergency signaling flares in Maryland, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, California and Pennsylvania while maintaining its headquarters in Maryland. SFC purchased comprehensive general liability policies from two different brokers, holding all communication and discussions regarding the policies in Maryland. After a toxic chemical used in manufacturing its flares was detected in the groundwater near its California facility, SFC was subject to lawsuits which were eventually dismissed because it was determined that SFC didn’t emit the chemical. Afterwards, it voluntarily tested its Indiana facility and found that the chemical may have been emitted at the Indiana location. SFC was granted inclusion into the Indiana Department of Environmental Management’s Voluntary Remediation Program. SFC requested defense and indemnification from the insurers, who denied an obligation. 

SFC sought a declaratory judgment against the insurers and filed for summary judgment that Indiana law governed the policy’s interpretation and also that the insurers had a duty to defend, which the trial court granted. The insurers sought application of Maryland law, as its interpretation would be more beneficial to their position. The Court of Appeals sided with neither party and reversed the trial court’s holding, determining that a site-specific approach should apply to the policy. In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Standard Fusee Corporation, No. 49S04-1006-CV-318, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana has long applied the uniform approach to multistate insurance policies. The Court went on to hold that, in order to determine which state’s law governed the contract, a “most intimate contacts” test should be used. Because a single event is not determinative as to which state has the most intimate contacts with the transaction, several factors must be weighed together. Because SFC was located in Maryland, all of the correspondence regarding the insurance took place in Maryland, and because the policies were retained and the premiums were paid in Maryland, the Court held that Maryland law should uniformly apply to the dispute.

     In insurance law, the insured has the initial burden to make accurate representations in the application.  If an insurance policy is issued, the insurer then has the burden to issue a policy with clear language and provide insurance according to the policy's terms.  Because the insurer is charged with writing an unambiguous policy, if a dispute between the insured and insurer turns on a term that is deemed ambiguous the policy is interpreted in favor of coverage. 

     In Allied Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Good, the Court of Appeals held that a policy is void ab initio and summary judgment should be entered in favor of the insurer when the insured makes a material misrepresentation on the application for insurance.  Specifically, the Court held:  "Because the uncontradicted evidence indicates Linda misrepresented the Goods' cancellation history on the application for homeowners insurance and Allied would not have issued the policy if it had known the truth about their history, the trial court erred by denying Allied's motion for summary judgment."

     Of note, Indiana appellate courts have stated that an ambiguity does not exist merely because the parties proffered differing interpretations of the policy language.  In this case, no ambiguity was found even though one of the three judges on the appellate panel interpreted the disputed language in the policy differently.  In dissent, Judge Bailey opined that the insured may not have provided misinformation in the application.  Judge Bailey further stated that, even if the insured provided misinformation, an insurer's use of a self-serving affidavit may not be sufficient to prove the materiality of the misrepresentation.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held that a master homeowners’ association was required to be established by the controlling ordinances for a planned unit development (“PUD”) and that a swimming pool was within the scope of the association’s responsibilities.

The City of Greenwood adopted a zoning ordinance for planned unit developments which provided “there shall be established a homeowners association to provide for the control and maintenance of all common areas.” A developer submitted the Master Plan for The Pines of Greenwood’s PUD, and it consisted of five communities with two types of homes and densities, the Pines of Greenwood (“POG”) and the Village Pines (“VP”). The Master Plan did not contain any definitions, but was approved by the Greenwood Common Council in an ordinance that amended the city’s zoning ordinance (“Master Plan Ordinance”). Later, covenants and restrictions were recorded establishing two separate homeowners’ associations for the POG and VP communities. However, a master homeowners’ association was never established for The Pines as a whole. 

A swimming pool was built in the POG community, but not in the VP community. The POG covenants stated that only POG property owners could use the pool. The VP community filed a complaint seeking to reform the POG covenant because it “mistakenly omitted a provision whereby the residents of VP would be permitted to use the community swimming pool” located in the POG area. The VP community argued that a master homeowners’ association should be established for maintenance and operation of the common areas. The trial court held that the creation of a master homeowners’ association to control the common areas was not expressly stated in the documents reflecting the development of The Pines. VP appealed.

The issue in The Village Pines at the Pines of Greenwood Homeowners' Assn. Inc. v. The Pines of Greenwood Homeowners' Assn. Inc., Case No. 41A01-0912-CV-568, was whether the Master Plan Ordinance required a master homeowners’ association, and if required, what areas this association would control. The Court read the PUD zoning ordinance and the Master Plan Ordinance together because they contained the same subject matter and, thus, should be read together to come to a “harmonious statutory scheme.” Both the PUD ordinance and Master Plan Ordinance discussed a master homeowners’ association. Thus, a master homeowners’ association was required for The Pines. Furthermore, when deciding if the master homeowners’ association responsibilities included the swimming pool, it looked at the terms “amenities” and “park area” contained in the ordinances. Although the terms were not defined, it used the plain, ordinary and usual meanings of the words. It held that the swimming pool was within the definition of the terms because a pool is an “amenity or park area available as a recreation area to all residents.” Therefore, it was within the master homeowners association’s responsibilities to properly control, maintain and operate it. The Court reversed the trial court’s holding and ordered the parties to engage in mediation.

The Indiana Court of Appeals encourages cooperation and conflict resolution among attorneys to resolve issues outside of court, but time extensions still require formal relief given directly by the court.

Mary Booher slipped and fell in a Hampton Inn bathtub. Her accident was the first in nearly 5 months after Hampton Inn had covered its bathtubs with a non-skid surface in compliance with safety standards. Mary and her husband filed suit. After receiving two time extensions to reply to Hampton Inn’s motion for summary judgment, another time extension was needed because the Boohers’ attorney was facing major surgery and their expert needed extra time to complete his report. The attorney contacted Hampton Inn’s counsel to explain that another extension would be needed. Hampton Inn’s counsel agreed to the extension, and relying on this out-of-court agreement, the attorney never filed a formal request with the trial court. Three weeks after the second extension deadline had passed, the Boohers submitted their reply to the trial court. Hampton Inn moved to strike based on Trial Rule 56, which the trial court granted. It later granted summary judgment in favor of Hampton Inn. The Boohers appealed.

In Mary Booher, et al. v. Sheeram, LLC, No. 20A03-1005-CT-338, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in its decision to strike the Boohers’ reply and properly entered summary judgment in favor of Hampton Inn. Under Trial Rule 56, a trial court does not have the discretion to accept late-filed documents. The Court stated that the attorney’s reliance on the out-of-court agreement was not sufficient to extend the due date, and that he should have filed a motion for a time extension with the trial court. It stated that even under the extraordinarily difficult circumstances in this case, the court’s “proverbial hands were tied” as the Supreme Court made it clear that trial courts have no discretion to accept untimely filed documents. Additionally, because Hampton Inn applied a non-skid coating which complied with industry standards, it protected its business invitees from foreseeable dangers. Hampton Inn fulfilled its duty to exercise reasonable care, and therefore, there were no issues of material fact. Thus, the Court affirmed the trial court’s holding.
 

The Indiana Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that the definition of a “courthouse” for a notice statute can be a temporary courthouse in which the courts convene while a permanent county courthouse is undergoing repairs.

In August 2009, the Grant County Courthouse was undergoing repairs. Due to the repairs, the court was relocated to a temporary site. Around this time, Claudette Gee’s home was ordered into foreclosure. The Grant County Sheriff’s Department posted notice of the foreclosure on a bulletin board located next to the door of the temporary courtroom. A week after Gee’s property was purchased, Gee moved to set aside the sheriff’s sale. She argued that the sheriff’s office failed to post notice of the sale “at the door of the courthouse” as required by Indiana statute. The trial court denied Gee’s motion and Gee appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals.

In Claudette Gee v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 27A02-1003-MF-304, the issue on appeal was whether the sheriff followed the correct procedure when the sheriff posted notice of the sale at the temporary county court offices and not at the permanent county courthouse. The Court held that the sheriff complied with Indiana’s notice statute because a “courthouse” is defined as a place where judges convene to adjudicate disputes and administer justice. The Court relied on Black’s Law Dictionary for this definition, as it was not defined in a statute. Because the temporary courtroom was the place where three of the four county courts convened during renovations, the Court determined that the plain meaning of the statute also applied to temporary courtrooms. Therefore, the sheriff followed the proper notice procedure and the foreclosure sale was valid. The court noted, however, that Gee did not argue that the sheriff was required to post notice at both sites, and thus, the Court did not consider this issue. Affirmed.

The Indiana Supreme Court held that a contribution by a parent corporation to the capital of its subsidiary is not automatically excluded from the Indiana sales and use tax. Instead, the Court looked at whether consideration was given for the capital contribution. If the contribution was made with consideration, then there was a retail sale, and thus, Indiana sales or use tax would be imposed.

In Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC, Case No. 49S10-1010-TA-519, Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. had a riverboat casino manufactured. It bought the riverboat in Alabama for $34,689,719.00 and, in exchange, received title and possession of the riverboat. Pinnacle paid no Alabama sales tax on this transaction. The next day, while in the international waters off the Gulf of Mexico, Pinnacle transferred title and possession of the riverboat to Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC. Prior to the transfer, Pinnacle owned a 97% interest in Belterra. A couple days after the transfer, Pinnacle subsequently obtained the remaining 3%. This gave Pinnacle 100% ownership of Belterra, its subsidiary. Afterwards, the riverboat floated to its new home in Indiana. In 2002, the Indiana Department of Revenue conducted a sales and use tax audit of Belterra. It issued a use tax assessment against Belterra in the amount of $1,869,783.00 plus penalty and interest. Both parties later filed cross motions for summary judgment, and after a hearing, the Tax Court granted Belterra’s motion and denied the Department’s. Thereafter, the Indiana Supreme Court granted review.

The issue before the court was whether the transfer of the riverboat from Pinnacle to Belterra was done without either side receiving consideration. In this case, Belterra submitted an affidavit in which the Board of Directors’ Resolution declared “[ ] the company hereby approves the transfer of ownership of the Riverboat Miss Belterra from Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. to Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC as a capital contribution and without consideration being paid to Pinnacle Entertainment…”. A question of law, such as whether consideration exists, is decided by the court. To have “consideration,” one must receive a benefit to the detriment of another. A benefit is defined as a legal right given from one person to another, where the person receiving the right would not otherwise be entitled. Money is not the only benefit one can receive from consideration. To determine whether there was any benefit, the Court evaluated the transaction closely. “A transaction structured solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes with no other legitimate business purpose will be considered a sham for taxation purposes.” To analyze the companies’ motive for the transaction, the court used the “step doctrine,” which is divided into the “end results” and “interdependence” tests. The end result of Pinnacle and Belterra’s transactions appears, from the outset, to be intended to avoid paying the Indiana use tax while maintaining complete control over the riverboat. Additionally, the series of transactions were so interdependent that it is unreasonable to conclude that the whole series would have been completed if not for the purpose of avoiding the sales and use taxes. After this application, the court determined that there was consideration and treated the acquisition of the riverboat from the manufacturer as a retail transaction subject to the Indiana use tax.   Therefore, the Tax Court’s holding was reversed and summary judgment was granted in favor of the Department.

The Indiana Supreme Court split in a 3:2 decision on the issue of whether an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy covered a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship under the insured’s contract.

Sheehan Construction Company was a general contractor on the Crystal Lake residential project, and was responsible for hiring subcontractors to build the houses. During the period when the houses were being built, Sheehan was insured by Continental Insurance Co. under a CGL policy that covered all damages the insured was legally obligated to pay because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” that were caused by an “occurrence” in the coverage territory. This policy excluded coverage for damages to the insured’s property and work that arose out of work performed on “your behalf by a subcontractor.” Sheehan was also insured by Somerville Construction, one of Sheehan’s subcontractors, under their CGL policy through Indiana Insurance Company.

In April 2000, Vincent B. Alig and his wife Mary Jean Alig purchased a home in Crystal Lake. A few years later, the Aligs experienced leaking windows, water damage, and other issues in their home and notified their homeowner insurance carrier, who later found that the problems resulted from faulty workmanship of Sheehan’s subcontractors. In November 2004, the Aligs filed suit against Sheehan alleging violation of Indiana Code sections 32-27-3-1 to 14 (concerning cause of action for construction defects). Later, more homeowners in the Crystal Lake subdivision joined and created a class-action suit. The class and Continental Insurance settled.   Continental filed for declaratory judgment claiming that Sheehan’s claims were not covered under the policy. Sheehan and the class filed a third-party complaint against Indiana Insurance and MJ Insurance, Sheehan’s insurance broker. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Continental, MJ, and Indiana Insurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

In Sheehan Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al., No. 49S02-1001-CV-32, Justices Robert Rucker, Brent Dickson, and Theodore Boehm held that CGL policies can cover an insured’s liability for a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship. The issue the Court grappled with was whether faulty workmanship is an “accident” within a standard CGL policy’s definition of an “occurrence.” The majority determined that faulty workmanship is an accident if the damage is the result of an unexpected or unforeseeable event. The Court defined an “accident” as an unexpected happening without intention or design. Implicit in this definition is a lack of intent. If the faulty workmanship was the product of unintentional conduct, then the resulting damage would be unforeseeable and would be an accident within the CGL policy’s definition of an “occurrence.” This analysis is fact specific and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the trial court did not conclude on the issue of whether the faulty workmanship was intentional or unintentional and the trial court’s judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Dissent:

Chief Justice Shepard: This opinion leads Indiana to the wrong result because CGL policies are not designed or priced to cover any demand an insured may face. Oral argument suggested that an insurance product that covers an insured’s faulty work may not even exist. Therefore, CGL policies should not cover faulty subcontractor work as an accident within standard coverage of a CGL policy’s definition of an “occurrence.”  

Justice Sullivan: An “occurrence” under a CGL policy is an accidental damage caused by an insured or an insured’s subcontractors, to property owned by third-parties, but not the costs of repairing work performed. Instead, a party who wishes to insure against damages from faulty workmanship should obtain protection from a performance bond.

In May 2003, attorney Kenneth E. Lauter was retained by a client to pursue an employment discrimination claim. The client signed a written “Attorney Services Contract” agreeing to a contingency fee based on the amount recovered. On the bottom margin of a page in the contract there was a hand written “additional retainer fee.” It stated that after the attorney completed his “due diligence,” if the client and attorney agreed to file litigation in federal court, that the client would pay an additional retainer fee. The client initialed the additional retainer fee provision and paid an initial engagement fee of $750.00. The attorney filed the claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which issued a finding of no probable cause in December 2003. The attorney then received the details of the investigation by filing a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in February 2004. The attorney referred to this as his “due diligence.” The next day, he called the client to discuss pursuing the case in federal court. At this time the attorney reminded his client that there would be an additional cost of $4250.00. This was the first time that the client knew the exact amount of the “additional” retainer fee. The client agreed; however, this was never reduced to writing, nor did the attorney recommend that the client seek independent counsel. Three days later the client wrote a check for the additional retainer fee. In March 2006, the client’s claim was successfully settled for $75,000.00. 

Disciplinary proceedings were later brought against the attorney. A hearing officer concluded that the attorney did not violate the Indiana Professional Conduct (IPC) Rules 1.5(b), 1.5(c), or 1.8(a). The Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission sought review.

In the Matter of Kenneth E. Lauter, Case No. 55S00-0906-DI-267, the Supreme Court held that: (1) the attorney’s fee agreement violated the IPC rules, and (2) that public reprimand was warranted. The Court stated that attorneys need to clearly disclose the fee in writing after completing their due diligence, with the consent of the client. Because the attorney did not indicate to the client what the additional retainer would be or how it would be determined, he violated IPC Rules 1.5(b) and 1.5(c). 

An attorney is required to communicate the fee basis by placing the fee agreement in writing and having it signed by the client. It also needs to state the method by which the fee is to be determined and, at a minimum, should give the client an idea of the client’s possible exposure by disclosing a range with an upper limit. This way a client has the ability to “attorney shop” if they determine the fee is too high. The purpose of this is to protect the lay client who is unfamiliar with legalese and industry standards. 

When the additional retainer fee is undetermined, the attorney will have the burden of fair dealing and allotment of risk because an attorney has a more sophisticated understanding of fee agreements. The Court declined to find the attorney violated Rule 1.8(a) because the attorney violated rule 1.5(b) from the outset. Therefore, the attorney committed professional misconduct and the Court imposed a public reprimand.

Dissent by Justices Dickson & Rucker: The Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission did not prove a charged violation by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, the hearing officer correctly found no violation in recommending a finding in favor of Lauter.

            Lost Creek is a not-for-profit organization that has been operating a shooting range since 1934 in a rural area of Vigo County, Indiana. Shooting activities at Lost Creek’s shooting range increased after September 11, 2001, because members of Vigo County’s law enforcement began using their range. On July 17, 2007, the homeowners who lived near Lost Creek filed a complaint for injunctive relief seeking to abate the nuisance of the shooting range. 

            In Phyllis Woodsmall, et al. v. Lost Creek Township Conservation Club, Inc., Case No. 84A01-1001-PL-33, the trial court refused to enjoin Lost Creek because the homeowners failed to establish their burden of proof. Accordingly, the homeowners appealed, from a negative judgment, and the case was reviewed by the Indiana Court of Appeals under the clearly erroneous standard. To prevail under this standard, the homeowners had to establish that the conclusion reached by the trial court was contrary to the law.

            In Indiana, the statute defines an actionable nuisance as: “Whatever is (1) injurious to health; (2) indecent; (3) offensive to the senses; or (4) an obstruction to the free use of property; so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property [.]” IC § 32-30-6-6. The homeowners’ statutory nuisance complaint concerned the legal use of land that affected a finite number of people. Thus, they alleged a private, per accidens nuisance against Lost Creek.

In February 2000, Commercial Coin entered into a ten-year written real estate lease agreement with an owner of an apartment complex. However, the lease agreement was never recorded. In 2005, Park P purchased the apartment complex where Commercial Coin’s coin-operated laundry machines had been previously installed pursuant to the lease agreement. Since the installation of its laundry machines, Commercial Coin has had signs on the laundry room walls and labels on each machine displaying that the machines were owned and operated by Commercial Coin pursuant to a written lease agreement. After Park P’s purchase, Commercial Coin continued to maintain the facilities. 

In 2008, Park P filed a complaint to quiet title and sought declaratory judgment alleging that the lease agreement was void because it was never recorded as required by Indiana statute. Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Park P and held that there was not a genuine issue of material fact because the lease agreement was not properly filed. Commercial Coin appealed.

In Crown Coin Meter Company, et al. v. Park P, LLC, Case No. 34D04-0802-PL-229, the issue was whether Park P was a bona fide purchaser, and therefore, bought the apartment complex without notice of Commercial Coin’s lease agreement with the previous owner. To qualify as a bonafide purchaser in Indiana, one has to purchase in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice of the outstanding rights of others. If Park P did not have notice, the agreement would be void as a matter of law. In Indiana, a lease in excess of three-years that is not recorded is void against a bona fide purchaser.