Laws Real Estate

By Steven M. Badger*
email: sbadger@boselaw.com

            The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on January 14, 2011 in a case of first impression that will decide whether a high school athletic association may require media organizations to buy licenses for internet streaming of high school athletic events.

The appellate court is reviewing a lower court decision last June upholding the Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association’s (the “Wisconsin Athletic Association”) policies regulating internet streaming of high school tournament events. Two Gannett newspapers in Wisconsin challenged the licensing policy on First Amendment grounds.  

            The Wisconsin licensing scheme at issue requires any media organization to pay a fee ranging from $250 to $1500 for the right to stream video of any tournament event over the internet. The Wisconsin Athletic Association also reserves to itself “sole discretion” to grant such rights without specifying any standards for the exercise of its discretion.

Under the Wisconsin licensing policy, any media organization that pays the licensing fee and receives internet streaming rights must provide a master copy its video to a private company holding exclusive broadcast rights.   That private company then may market the video and the media organization that made the video is entitled to a 20% share of the proceeds as a royalty.

The lower court observed in its June ruling that “ultimately, this case is about commerce, not the right to a Free Press.” Gannett’s appeal however argues that the Wisconsin Athletic Association’s revenue-generating motive does not trump the media’s First Amendment rights.

Gannett also focuses its constitutional arguments on the unrestricted discretion the Wisconsin Athletic Association reserves for itself to grant licenses to media organizations of its choosing. Gannett contends that if the athletic association wishes to pick and choose which media organizations may stream video over the internet, the First Amendment requires it do so on an even-handed basis without any threat of exclusion based on viewpoint.

An array of national media associations and media companies has joined in supporting Gannett’s appeal through the filing of an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief. Those supporting organizations include the Newspaper Association of America, the American Society of News Editors, the National Press Photographers Association and The Online News Association. The supporting media companies include Sun Times Media, LLC and Lee Enterprises, Incorporated, among others.

The Wisconsin Athletic Association is supported by two amicus briefs, one by the National Federation of State High School Associations and the other by 10 state high school associations, including the IHSAA.  

            A decision by the Seventh Circuit is expected this summer or fall. Any of the parties could then seek review by the United States Supreme Court. The decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals are binding precedent for lower federal courts in the states of Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin.

*Steve Badger is a partner at Bose McKinney & Evans and represents media organizations and journalists in media law and First Amendment matters.

The Indiana Wage Claims Statute and the Indiana Wage Payment Statute are separate laws that address the same issue. The statutes provide the procedure for payment of employees, but are to be used in separate and distinct circumstances, the Court of Appeals held last week.

In Hollis v. Defender Security Co., No. 49A02-1004-PL-464, Robert Hollis filed suit against his former employer for failure to pay wages in a timely fashion. The court said that in circumstances where an employee has been separated from his former employer, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, the procedure for a claim is the same. The former employee must file a claim under the Wage Claims Statute with the Department of Labor first and seek remedy from that body rather than filing in the court system right away.

The court held that when a current employee has a claim against his employer, the employee is allowed to file suit in the court system right away and pursue action under the Wage Payment Statute. The reasoning for this decision is to keep frivolous lawsuits by disgruntled former employees out of the court system. Should a former employee’s claim make it through the Department of Labor process, the complaint can then be taken into the courts. Because Hollis was separated from his employment at the time he filed suit, he should have pursued the claim within the Department of Labor and under the Wage Claims Statute, and it was because of this that his case was dismissed.

In a case involving the determination of work bonuses being paid as “wages” under Indiana law, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that in circumstances where the bonuses are not related to the amount of time an employee works, are not guaranteed to be paid regularly, and are not granted based on the employer’s financial success, the bonuses do not fall under the wage classification for purposes of Indiana statutes.

While Orlando Quezare was employed as a collections account representative for Byrider Finance, Inc., his employment agreement called for bonus payments if certain percentages were met, each week, regarding the amount of delinquency on his accounts and also if his team of account reps met certain goals.  After he was terminated, Quezare sued Byrider, alleging that the company violated Indiana law by failing to make wage payments within ten business days of the pay period ending date.  Bose McKinney & Evans attorneys Gregory Guevara and Emily Yates argued successfully that the bonus payments did not constitute wages under the statute.

In the opinion of Quezare v. Byrider Finance, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that, in order for bonus payments to be considered wages under Indiana law, the payments must be directly related to the amount of time an employee works, must be paid to the employee with regularity, and cannot be tied to the financial success of the employer.  Because Quezare’s bonuses were tied only to his individual success, were never guaranteed, and also because Indiana case law doesn’t consider team bonuses to be wages, Byrider was not in violation of Indiana law.

The Court of Appeals of Indiana upheld the trial court in a decision granting summary judgment in favor of a firefighter who allegedly made malicious comments during the course of fighting a fire.

Terry Hart, Assistant Fire Chief with the Martinsville Fire Department, was overheard by the son of the plaintiff saying “let it burn” while responding in an assisting capacity to a fire in Washington Township. In a complaint against Hart, as an individual and in his capacity with the fire department, and against the Martinsville Fire Department for negligence, the family who owns the burned property alleged that Hart and the fire department didn’t take proper care in ensuring that the property was protected from the fire. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, citing the common law and black letter rule of governmental immunity. 

In the opinion of Ellis v. City of Martinsville, No. 55A01-1003-CT-141, the court determined that the negligence actions against Hart and the city did not have issues of material fact and granted summary judgment for the municipalities. The court sided with the argument that the fire department cannot be held liable for the decisions made by those in charge of its operations and also that the individuals in charge of making those decisions cannot be held liable as long as the decision is made in the course of employment. Because Hart arrived at the scene in firefighting gear and was paid for his time at the fire, he was determined to be acting in his capacity as a firefighter and, thus, was granted immunity from liability to the homeowners.

The Indiana Supreme Court recently held that, in an insurance dispute regarding defense and indemnification of environmental liability, the uniform approach (a single state’s law governing the entire contract) should be applied, and the state with the “most intimate contacts” will have its law pertain to the contract.

Standard Fusee Corporation (“SFC”) previously operated factories manufacturing emergency signaling flares in Maryland, Indiana, New Jersey, Ohio, California and Pennsylvania while maintaining its headquarters in Maryland. SFC purchased comprehensive general liability policies from two different brokers, holding all communication and discussions regarding the policies in Maryland. After a toxic chemical used in manufacturing its flares was detected in the groundwater near its California facility, SFC was subject to lawsuits which were eventually dismissed because it was determined that SFC didn’t emit the chemical. Afterwards, it voluntarily tested its Indiana facility and found that the chemical may have been emitted at the Indiana location. SFC was granted inclusion into the Indiana Department of Environmental Management’s Voluntary Remediation Program. SFC requested defense and indemnification from the insurers, who denied an obligation. 

SFC sought a declaratory judgment against the insurers and filed for summary judgment that Indiana law governed the policy’s interpretation and also that the insurers had a duty to defend, which the trial court granted. The insurers sought application of Maryland law, as its interpretation would be more beneficial to their position. The Court of Appeals sided with neither party and reversed the trial court’s holding, determining that a site-specific approach should apply to the policy. In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Standard Fusee Corporation, No. 49S04-1006-CV-318, the Indiana Supreme Court held that Indiana has long applied the uniform approach to multistate insurance policies. The Court went on to hold that, in order to determine which state’s law governed the contract, a “most intimate contacts” test should be used. Because a single event is not determinative as to which state has the most intimate contacts with the transaction, several factors must be weighed together. Because SFC was located in Maryland, all of the correspondence regarding the insurance took place in Maryland, and because the policies were retained and the premiums were paid in Maryland, the Court held that Maryland law should uniformly apply to the dispute.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that student loan funds that are deposited into a personal bank account are exempt from being attached by a judgment creditor.

Nikki Brindle and Patrick J. Arata entered into an agreed judgment whereby Brindle would pay Arata for legal services provided. Arata initiated proceedings to seek funds from Brindle’s bank account at National City Bank, at which time contained $3,367.01. A week later, Brindle filed an exemption claim and requested a hearing. At the hearing, Brindle introduced a voucher from the Academy of Art University stating that she would receive a check in the amount of $3,268.00 which was the amount left over after her tuition was paid to the university. The trial court denied Brindle’s exemption claim and ordered all funds except $300.00 to be transferred. The court stated the funds lost their exempt status when they were deposited into her bank account. Brindle appealed.

In Nikki Brindle v. Patrick J. Arata, No. 02A05-1004-SC-239, the Court of Appeals held that under U.S.C. Title 20 section 1095a, regarding wage garnishments, the plain language of the statute was clear that student loan funds and property traceable to those funds were exempt from garnishment or attachment. Furthermore, because there were no provisions to terminate this status, a contrary decision would render section 1095a meaningless, which the Court doubted was Congress’ intent. It stated that almost every recipient of student funds deposits their funds into a personal bank account and that it “could not imagine that Congress wishes those who receive student loans to stuff their mattresses with their rent money to prevent judgment creditors from attaching it.” Additionally, it distinguished the garnishment of retirement funds after they were deposited from the garnishment of student loan funds. The federal statutes are only extended to protect from the collection of student loans. The Court stated that "not being able to give something away is quite different from having it protected from being taken away." Retirement fund statutes do not apply to student loans. Therefore, the trial court’s holding was erroneous because the student loan funds that Brindle deposited into her bank account were protected, and Arata was prohibited from attachment. Trial court’s holding is reversed.
 

     In insurance law, the insured has the initial burden to make accurate representations in the application.  If an insurance policy is issued, the insurer then has the burden to issue a policy with clear language and provide insurance according to the policy's terms.  Because the insurer is charged with writing an unambiguous policy, if a dispute between the insured and insurer turns on a term that is deemed ambiguous the policy is interpreted in favor of coverage. 

     In Allied Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Good, the Court of Appeals held that a policy is void ab initio and summary judgment should be entered in favor of the insurer when the insured makes a material misrepresentation on the application for insurance.  Specifically, the Court held:  "Because the uncontradicted evidence indicates Linda misrepresented the Goods' cancellation history on the application for homeowners insurance and Allied would not have issued the policy if it had known the truth about their history, the trial court erred by denying Allied's motion for summary judgment."

     Of note, Indiana appellate courts have stated that an ambiguity does not exist merely because the parties proffered differing interpretations of the policy language.  In this case, no ambiguity was found even though one of the three judges on the appellate panel interpreted the disputed language in the policy differently.  In dissent, Judge Bailey opined that the insured may not have provided misinformation in the application.  Judge Bailey further stated that, even if the insured provided misinformation, an insurer's use of a self-serving affidavit may not be sufficient to prove the materiality of the misrepresentation.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held that a master homeowners’ association was required to be established by the controlling ordinances for a planned unit development (“PUD”) and that a swimming pool was within the scope of the association’s responsibilities.

The City of Greenwood adopted a zoning ordinance for planned unit developments which provided “there shall be established a homeowners association to provide for the control and maintenance of all common areas.” A developer submitted the Master Plan for The Pines of Greenwood’s PUD, and it consisted of five communities with two types of homes and densities, the Pines of Greenwood (“POG”) and the Village Pines (“VP”). The Master Plan did not contain any definitions, but was approved by the Greenwood Common Council in an ordinance that amended the city’s zoning ordinance (“Master Plan Ordinance”). Later, covenants and restrictions were recorded establishing two separate homeowners’ associations for the POG and VP communities. However, a master homeowners’ association was never established for The Pines as a whole. 

A swimming pool was built in the POG community, but not in the VP community. The POG covenants stated that only POG property owners could use the pool. The VP community filed a complaint seeking to reform the POG covenant because it “mistakenly omitted a provision whereby the residents of VP would be permitted to use the community swimming pool” located in the POG area. The VP community argued that a master homeowners’ association should be established for maintenance and operation of the common areas. The trial court held that the creation of a master homeowners’ association to control the common areas was not expressly stated in the documents reflecting the development of The Pines. VP appealed.

The issue in The Village Pines at the Pines of Greenwood Homeowners' Assn. Inc. v. The Pines of Greenwood Homeowners' Assn. Inc., Case No. 41A01-0912-CV-568, was whether the Master Plan Ordinance required a master homeowners’ association, and if required, what areas this association would control. The Court read the PUD zoning ordinance and the Master Plan Ordinance together because they contained the same subject matter and, thus, should be read together to come to a “harmonious statutory scheme.” Both the PUD ordinance and Master Plan Ordinance discussed a master homeowners’ association. Thus, a master homeowners’ association was required for The Pines. Furthermore, when deciding if the master homeowners’ association responsibilities included the swimming pool, it looked at the terms “amenities” and “park area” contained in the ordinances. Although the terms were not defined, it used the plain, ordinary and usual meanings of the words. It held that the swimming pool was within the definition of the terms because a pool is an “amenity or park area available as a recreation area to all residents.” Therefore, it was within the master homeowners association’s responsibilities to properly control, maintain and operate it. The Court reversed the trial court’s holding and ordered the parties to engage in mediation.

The Indiana Court of Appeals held, as a matter of first impression, that the definition of a “courthouse” for a notice statute can be a temporary courthouse in which the courts convene while a permanent county courthouse is undergoing repairs.

In August 2009, the Grant County Courthouse was undergoing repairs. Due to the repairs, the court was relocated to a temporary site. Around this time, Claudette Gee’s home was ordered into foreclosure. The Grant County Sheriff’s Department posted notice of the foreclosure on a bulletin board located next to the door of the temporary courtroom. A week after Gee’s property was purchased, Gee moved to set aside the sheriff’s sale. She argued that the sheriff’s office failed to post notice of the sale “at the door of the courthouse” as required by Indiana statute. The trial court denied Gee’s motion and Gee appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals.

In Claudette Gee v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, No. 27A02-1003-MF-304, the issue on appeal was whether the sheriff followed the correct procedure when the sheriff posted notice of the sale at the temporary county court offices and not at the permanent county courthouse. The Court held that the sheriff complied with Indiana’s notice statute because a “courthouse” is defined as a place where judges convene to adjudicate disputes and administer justice. The Court relied on Black’s Law Dictionary for this definition, as it was not defined in a statute. Because the temporary courtroom was the place where three of the four county courts convened during renovations, the Court determined that the plain meaning of the statute also applied to temporary courtrooms. Therefore, the sheriff followed the proper notice procedure and the foreclosure sale was valid. The court noted, however, that Gee did not argue that the sheriff was required to post notice at both sites, and thus, the Court did not consider this issue. Affirmed.

The Indiana Supreme Court held that a contribution by a parent corporation to the capital of its subsidiary is not automatically excluded from the Indiana sales and use tax. Instead, the Court looked at whether consideration was given for the capital contribution. If the contribution was made with consideration, then there was a retail sale, and thus, Indiana sales or use tax would be imposed.

In Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC, Case No. 49S10-1010-TA-519, Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. had a riverboat casino manufactured. It bought the riverboat in Alabama for $34,689,719.00 and, in exchange, received title and possession of the riverboat. Pinnacle paid no Alabama sales tax on this transaction. The next day, while in the international waters off the Gulf of Mexico, Pinnacle transferred title and possession of the riverboat to Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC. Prior to the transfer, Pinnacle owned a 97% interest in Belterra. A couple days after the transfer, Pinnacle subsequently obtained the remaining 3%. This gave Pinnacle 100% ownership of Belterra, its subsidiary. Afterwards, the riverboat floated to its new home in Indiana. In 2002, the Indiana Department of Revenue conducted a sales and use tax audit of Belterra. It issued a use tax assessment against Belterra in the amount of $1,869,783.00 plus penalty and interest. Both parties later filed cross motions for summary judgment, and after a hearing, the Tax Court granted Belterra’s motion and denied the Department’s. Thereafter, the Indiana Supreme Court granted review.

The issue before the court was whether the transfer of the riverboat from Pinnacle to Belterra was done without either side receiving consideration. In this case, Belterra submitted an affidavit in which the Board of Directors’ Resolution declared “[ ] the company hereby approves the transfer of ownership of the Riverboat Miss Belterra from Pinnacle Entertainment, Inc. to Belterra Resort Indiana, LLC as a capital contribution and without consideration being paid to Pinnacle Entertainment…”. A question of law, such as whether consideration exists, is decided by the court. To have “consideration,” one must receive a benefit to the detriment of another. A benefit is defined as a legal right given from one person to another, where the person receiving the right would not otherwise be entitled. Money is not the only benefit one can receive from consideration. To determine whether there was any benefit, the Court evaluated the transaction closely. “A transaction structured solely for the purpose of avoiding taxes with no other legitimate business purpose will be considered a sham for taxation purposes.” To analyze the companies’ motive for the transaction, the court used the “step doctrine,” which is divided into the “end results” and “interdependence” tests. The end result of Pinnacle and Belterra’s transactions appears, from the outset, to be intended to avoid paying the Indiana use tax while maintaining complete control over the riverboat. Additionally, the series of transactions were so interdependent that it is unreasonable to conclude that the whole series would have been completed if not for the purpose of avoiding the sales and use taxes. After this application, the court determined that there was consideration and treated the acquisition of the riverboat from the manufacturer as a retail transaction subject to the Indiana use tax.   Therefore, the Tax Court’s holding was reversed and summary judgment was granted in favor of the Department.

The Indiana Supreme Court split in a 3:2 decision on the issue of whether an “occurrence” under a commercial general liability (CGL) policy covered a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship under the insured’s contract.

Sheehan Construction Company was a general contractor on the Crystal Lake residential project, and was responsible for hiring subcontractors to build the houses. During the period when the houses were being built, Sheehan was insured by Continental Insurance Co. under a CGL policy that covered all damages the insured was legally obligated to pay because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” that were caused by an “occurrence” in the coverage territory. This policy excluded coverage for damages to the insured’s property and work that arose out of work performed on “your behalf by a subcontractor.” Sheehan was also insured by Somerville Construction, one of Sheehan’s subcontractors, under their CGL policy through Indiana Insurance Company.

In April 2000, Vincent B. Alig and his wife Mary Jean Alig purchased a home in Crystal Lake. A few years later, the Aligs experienced leaking windows, water damage, and other issues in their home and notified their homeowner insurance carrier, who later found that the problems resulted from faulty workmanship of Sheehan’s subcontractors. In November 2004, the Aligs filed suit against Sheehan alleging violation of Indiana Code sections 32-27-3-1 to 14 (concerning cause of action for construction defects). Later, more homeowners in the Crystal Lake subdivision joined and created a class-action suit. The class and Continental Insurance settled.   Continental filed for declaratory judgment claiming that Sheehan’s claims were not covered under the policy. Sheehan and the class filed a third-party complaint against Indiana Insurance and MJ Insurance, Sheehan’s insurance broker. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Continental, MJ, and Indiana Insurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

In Sheehan Construction Co., Inc., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al., No. 49S02-1001-CV-32, Justices Robert Rucker, Brent Dickson, and Theodore Boehm held that CGL policies can cover an insured’s liability for a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship. The issue the Court grappled with was whether faulty workmanship is an “accident” within a standard CGL policy’s definition of an “occurrence.” The majority determined that faulty workmanship is an accident if the damage is the result of an unexpected or unforeseeable event. The Court defined an “accident” as an unexpected happening without intention or design. Implicit in this definition is a lack of intent. If the faulty workmanship was the product of unintentional conduct, then the resulting damage would be unforeseeable and would be an accident within the CGL policy’s definition of an “occurrence.” This analysis is fact specific and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. In this case, the trial court did not conclude on the issue of whether the faulty workmanship was intentional or unintentional and the trial court’s judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Dissent:

Chief Justice Shepard: This opinion leads Indiana to the wrong result because CGL policies are not designed or priced to cover any demand an insured may face. Oral argument suggested that an insurance product that covers an insured’s faulty work may not even exist. Therefore, CGL policies should not cover faulty subcontractor work as an accident within standard coverage of a CGL policy’s definition of an “occurrence.”  

Justice Sullivan: An “occurrence” under a CGL policy is an accidental damage caused by an insured or an insured’s subcontractors, to property owned by third-parties, but not the costs of repairing work performed. Instead, a party who wishes to insure against damages from faulty workmanship should obtain protection from a performance bond.

Author:  Craig E. Pinkus

A 16 year-old at the time she listened to music through a website claiming to be “100%” lawful asked the US Supreme Court last July to review the decision of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals against her. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Whitney Harper, Petitioner v. Maverick Recording Company, et al. , No. 10-94 (U.S. July 16, 2010). One of thousands of young people sued for copyright infringement by downloading music, the judgment and damages awarded against her were apparently so routine for the recording industry that it waived the right to respond to the petition.

In the wake of an amicus brief filed by Harvard Law professor Charles Nesson and others, however, the Court in a simple letter from the clerk requested a response from the record industry by October 15, 2010.  For most lawyers and clients, this is a request you cannot refuse.

An “innocent infringer” defense is provided by the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). It is not a complete defense but can be considered by the court as a matter in mitigation that can reduce a damage award for the acts in question. Of particular interest in the 7th Circuit is that the denial of certiorari would arguably affirm the decision in BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 892 (7th Cir. Ill. 2005) which makes a showing of innocent infringement in these cases a virtual impossibility.

There is naturally no guarantee the Court will grant certiorari, but the request for a response means that it is more likely than is the case with nearly all certiorari petitions. Many observers have argued for years that the flood of lawsuits against downloaders would ultimately fail as a business strategy for the music industry in the internet world. But a cert grant holds the possibility that the legal strategy will need to be revised without waiting for the business strategy to change.

            Lost Creek is a not-for-profit organization that has been operating a shooting range since 1934 in a rural area of Vigo County, Indiana. Shooting activities at Lost Creek’s shooting range increased after September 11, 2001, because members of Vigo County’s law enforcement began using their range. On July 17, 2007, the homeowners who lived near Lost Creek filed a complaint for injunctive relief seeking to abate the nuisance of the shooting range. 

            In Phyllis Woodsmall, et al. v. Lost Creek Township Conservation Club, Inc., Case No. 84A01-1001-PL-33, the trial court refused to enjoin Lost Creek because the homeowners failed to establish their burden of proof. Accordingly, the homeowners appealed, from a negative judgment, and the case was reviewed by the Indiana Court of Appeals under the clearly erroneous standard. To prevail under this standard, the homeowners had to establish that the conclusion reached by the trial court was contrary to the law.

            In Indiana, the statute defines an actionable nuisance as: “Whatever is (1) injurious to health; (2) indecent; (3) offensive to the senses; or (4) an obstruction to the free use of property; so as essentially to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property [.]” IC § 32-30-6-6. The homeowners’ statutory nuisance complaint concerned the legal use of land that affected a finite number of people. Thus, they alleged a private, per accidens nuisance against Lost Creek.

In February 2000, Commercial Coin entered into a ten-year written real estate lease agreement with an owner of an apartment complex. However, the lease agreement was never recorded. In 2005, Park P purchased the apartment complex where Commercial Coin’s coin-operated laundry machines had been previously installed pursuant to the lease agreement. Since the installation of its laundry machines, Commercial Coin has had signs on the laundry room walls and labels on each machine displaying that the machines were owned and operated by Commercial Coin pursuant to a written lease agreement. After Park P’s purchase, Commercial Coin continued to maintain the facilities. 

In 2008, Park P filed a complaint to quiet title and sought declaratory judgment alleging that the lease agreement was void because it was never recorded as required by Indiana statute. Trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Park P and held that there was not a genuine issue of material fact because the lease agreement was not properly filed. Commercial Coin appealed.

In Crown Coin Meter Company, et al. v. Park P, LLC, Case No. 34D04-0802-PL-229, the issue was whether Park P was a bona fide purchaser, and therefore, bought the apartment complex without notice of Commercial Coin’s lease agreement with the previous owner. To qualify as a bonafide purchaser in Indiana, one has to purchase in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice of the outstanding rights of others. If Park P did not have notice, the agreement would be void as a matter of law. In Indiana, a lease in excess of three-years that is not recorded is void against a bona fide purchaser. 

           Our First Amendment right to express ourselves is one of our most cherished freedoms.  It is a right that is sometimes abused, but the law provides free expression ample breathing space to avoid stifling that right.

            The Indiana Supreme Court and the Indiana Court of Appeals recently addressed freedom of expression in two cases where it was claimed that speakers abused their free speech rights by making defamatory misstatements that harmed another person.

            In Dugan v. Mittal Steel USA Inc., No. 45S05-1002-CV-121 (June 17, 2010), the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that certain defamatory statements made about an employee during an employer’s investigation of the disappearance of company equipment were protected by a qualified privilege and therefore not a basis for the employee’s defamation claim.  Indiana law recognizes a “privilege” or legal protection in certain circumstances where it is particularly important as a matter of public policy to encourage speech.  When such a privilege applies, speakers are liable for defamation only if they knew their statement was false or had substantial doubt about the truth of the statement.

            In Dugan, an employee claimed she was defamed by a supervisor who told the company’s chief of security that the employee had defrauded the company and stolen its equipment.  The Supreme Court had no difficulty finding that the statements were defamatory per se, because they accused the employee of criminal conduct.  However, the Court recognized that the supervisor had a duty to cooperate with his company’s investigation of theft and report what he knew or heard to his employer.  It is sound public policy to encourage such communications and therefore Indiana law applies a privilege to protect and encourage those communications.

The employee argued that the supervisor’s statements should not be protected because they were based only on second-hand information he had received from others, rather than his direct, personal observation.  The Indiana Supreme Court expressly rejected that argument. The Court explained:

“It is unreasonable and contrary to sound policy for the common interest qualified privilege for intra-company communications about theft of company property to apply only for statements made on personal knowledge and to exclude the reporting of information received from others.”

It is not hard to imagine how an intra-company investigation of theft would be hampered if employees were not encouraged to report everything they knew or heard that could assist the investigation.   Application of the qualified privilege does not depend on the source of the speaker’s information, but rather whether the speaker “lacked any grounds for belief as to the truth of the statements.”

The Indiana Court of Appeals opinion in In re Paternity of K.D., No. 49A02-0907-JV-693 (June 29, 2010) addressed a different problem – under what circumstances may a Court order a person to refrain from speaking about a particular subject.  Government bans on speech are referred to as “prior restraints” because they seek to stop or silence people before they have expressed themselves.  Prior restraints are rarely appropriate under the First Amendment because they are in effect government censorship of expression.

In K.D., the court faced a harrowing situation involving allegations by a mother that her daughter had been sexually abused by her father.  The case involved a paternity action brought before the juvenile court.  Two different judges on two different occasions found the mother’s allegations of abuse against the father to be unsubstantiated.  After the second time the court rejected the mother’s allegations of abuse, she took her story to the press.  The mother repeated her allegations in a series of newspapers and harshly criticized the father's lawyer and the judges who handled the case.

In response to the articles, the father asked the court to find the mother in contempt for allegedly violating Indiana juvenile law by discussing the proceedings with the press.  The Indiana juvenile court declined to hold the mother in contempt, but the court did expressly bar the mother from talking any further with the news media or anyone else about the case.  The mother appealed from that order.

The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the order as an overbroad and invalid prior restraint.  In doing so, the Court of Appeals applied the well-established First Amendment rule that:  “Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to the court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”  That rule was established in the famous “Pentagon Papers” case in which the United States Supreme Court struck down a court order prohibiting the New York Times from reporting information received from an informant about a top secret Defense Department study about the Viet Nam War.  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

"Jetson, You're Fired!"

            Indiana is an “employment at will” state, i.e. generally, employment may be terminated by the employer or employee at will, with or without reason. The Indiana Supreme Court has recognized only three exceptions to this doctrine. In Baker v. Tremco, Inc., Cause No. 29S02-0902-cv-00065, the Court extended the second exception, which rests on retaliatory discharge.

            Baker believed that one of Tremco’s suppliers was overcharging schools for their products and services. Baker claims that he was forced to resign because of his refusal to sell these products, and sued Tremco for breach of contract/wrongful termination.

            In McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 390, 428 (Ind. 1988), the Court had found a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine “when an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right.” The Court went on to state “firing an employee for refusing to commit an illegal act for which he would be personally liable is as much a violation of public policy declared by the legislature as firing an employee for filing a workmen’s compensation claim.” Id. at 392-93 (emphasis added).

            In Baker, the Indiana Supreme Court extended this exception to include instances where an employee is not fired – but is constructively discharged from his employment for refusing to participate in illegal activity. The Court stated: “Depending on the facts, it is merely retaliatory discharge in reverse.” Despite the extended exception, the Court held that Baker’s facts did not fall within the ambit of the exception because the alleged overpricing did not, as a matter of law, contravene the public bidding statutes.